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This chapter provides the introduction of the studies presented in this thesis. Firstly, backgrounds
regarding the recent transformation of electricity markets will be explained. Secondly, research
objectives of the studies will be presented. Finally, problems addressed in this thesis are presented
after introducing research  elds related to thestudies.
1.1 Backgrounds
For a long time, many countries have vertically integrated electricity markets for ensuring a stable
supply of electricity. In the vertically integrated electricity markets, a limited number of power
companies have conducted generation, transmission, and retail of electricity. Nevertheless, those
electricity markets with centralized structure mainly have issues on electricity charges and services
o ered by the suppliers [1, 2]. First, consumers cannot recognize whether current electricity charges
are appropriate or not since they do not have any suppliers for the comparison. Second, electricity
suppliersdo not seem to actively improve their services sinceno competition occurs among a limited
number of suppliers.
Structural transformation in electricity markets has emerged in many countries to ameliorate
the services in electricity markets. As the  rst step of the transformation, traditionally centralized
electricity markets have been deregulated and divided into several sectors. The deregulation aims at
theparticipation of variouselectricity suppliers in themarketsand enhancing competition among the
suppliers. Electricity retail marketshavebeen gradually liberalized toprovideconsumerswith choices
among electricity suppliers. Asdescribed above, power companiesprovideelectricity to consumersat
relatively higher chargesdue to no competition among thecompanies. Recently, many countrieshave
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deregulated their electricity markets to o er lower charges to consumers. For instance, the Japanese
government hasgradually deregulated their electricity markets. Thederegulation hasallowed various
companies to enter electricity retail for all consumers in Japan since2016.
As modernization of power grids, smart grids have been considered to increase reliability, re-
siliency, sustainability, and energy e ciency by using advanced metering and communication tech-
nologies [3]. The anticipated smart grid bene ts are improving power reliability and quality, accom-
modating distributed power sources, improving resilienceto disruption by natural disasters, and so on.
Bidirectional power  ow realized in smart grids might transforms the structure of electricity markets
than ever. The expected bene ts of smart grids in terms of consumers are (i) to provide consumers
with actionableand timely information about consumers’ energy usageand (ii) to increaseconsumers’
choiceand enable new products, services, and markets [3].
From the consumers’ viewpoint, the roles of consumers in electricity markets have been greatly
changed with the transformation. In traditionally centralized electricity markets, consumers do not
have any alternatives to their electricity suppliers. After the deregulation of centralized electricity
markets, on theother hand, consumers will havealternatives for their electricity suppliers. Moreover,
consumers will possibly have chances to provide surplus electricity to its neighbors in future smart
grids. Thus, consumers’ choices arenot only purchasing electricity from suppliersbut also providing
surplus electricity to others in the future.
1.2 Research objective
Although new types of trading will be available in the transformation of electricity markets, liber-
alization might pose issues regarding consumers’ viewpoints. Consumers do not necessarily act in
liberalized electricity markets as expected. For instance, many consumers have not switched their
suppliers in many countries though consumers can choose electricity suppliers after the deregulation
of electricity retail [4]. This trend might not lead to reduce electricity charges even though relatively
lower charges is one of the expected outcomes of the deregulation. Besides, if consumers will not
actively participate in electricity sharing markets in smart grids similar to the cases in electricity
retail, mechanisms for electricity sharing might also fail since active participation of end-users is an
inevitable factor for the success of resource sharing [5, 6]. Characteristics regarding the deregulated
markets should be examined carefully to avoid causing large impacts to society such as California
electricity crisis in 2001 [7].
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Theobjectiveof thestudiespresented in this thesis is to analyzeconsumers’ bene ts in electricity
marketstoconsider successful market mechanisms. Thesestudiesprovideopportunitiestounderstand
consumers’ bene tsandprovideinsightsfor themechanismdesignof electricity markets. Thesestudies
clarify thebene tsof consumers about their decision in electricity trading. An exampleof insights is
information about the decision making of consumers in electricity markets. One of the applications
of these studies is a tool for the “proof of concept” of operations regarding electricity markets. For
electricity suppliers, thetool canbeused tocheck thee ectson thesettingsof their electricity services.
Besides, for policymakers such asgovernmentsor public o ces, the tool gives insights to understand
thecharacteristics of consumers such as their bene ts, behaviors, etc.
1.3 Related works
Mechanisms for electricity markets require consideration in many factors such as engineering, eco-
nomics, social and political aspects. Since electricity markets have transformed into a more complex
stylethan ever, many kindsof problemsmust beaddressed toprovidedesirablebene tsfor consumers.
This section introduces related studieson theproblems as an overview of research  elds.
Managingproduction and demand of electricity
Matchingproductionanddemandfor electricity inaparticular timeinterval isinevitabletoavoidpower
failure. These kinds of problems must be solved to continuously provide electricity to consumers
as infrastructure for their daily life. Thus, managing production and demand is the fundamental
constraints on electricity provided in electricity markets.
To determine electricity distribution according to constraints on production and demand, mathe-
matical modeling techniquessuch aslinear programming areutilized. For instance, Georgiou presents
a mixed integer linear programming model for the long-term energy planning of power systems in
[8]. Regarding deregulated electricity markets, Sen et al. introduce algorithms for multi-objective
optimization about transmission linecongestion, line loss, and price volatility [9].
Integratingenergy storagetorealizestablesupply of electricity
Production from renewable energy cannot be controlled since the amounts of electricity production
depend on uncertain conditions such as wind, solar, wave, and so on. Energy storage might facilitate
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this problem since energy storage can o set the gap between production and demand. Although a
number of energy storage technologies have already been available, they need more advancements
than ever sinceenergy storage for electricity markets requires large-scale capacity [10].
Researchers propose models to assess the way to integrate energy storage systems into electricity
networks. Babrowski et al. introduceamodel to analyze theallocation and amount of energy storage
systems required in Germany considering transmission from renewable energy supply to the storage
systems [11]. Velik et al. present an architecture for managing prosumers’ PV systems and battery
storage in microgrids [12].
Designingmechanismsfor electricity markets
Electricity markets require mechanisms to match suppliers and consumers by economic perspectives
in addition to methodsfor distribution of electricity. Hence, mechanism design becomesan important
process to realize successful electricity markets. In addition to consideration of the characteristics of
electricity described above, economic aspects are involved in themechanism design.
There are a variety of mechanisms for each type of electricity market. A typical example is
auction mechanisms to determine electricity trading by adjusting electricity prices based on rules of
the auction. Karaca et al. introduce a game theoretic approach to examine auction mechanisms for
electricity markets to realize truthful bids and prevent strategic manipulations by participants [13].
Another example is the mechanism of Demand Response (DR), which mainly aims at reducing peak
demand. In [14], Rekaet al. proposeaDR scheme for smart grids using game theory.
Forecastingproduction and demand of electricity
Demand forecasting will become more complex after the deregulation of electricity markets. For in-
stance, DR might increasedi culty in forecastingdemand [15]. Furthermore, forecasting isinevitable
to utilize renewable energy since production from renewable energy is considered to be uncontrol-
lableas noted above. Hence, forecasting technologies become crucial for thesuccessful utilization of
demand participation and renewable energy. These technologies are also related to the mechanism
design of markets.
Regarding renewable energy, forecasting models are examined for each type of energy source. In
[16], Bacher et al. present a method for online forecasting of production from PV systems based on
data collected from PV systems on rooftops in Denmark. Wang et al. present a review of forecasting
4
models of wind power in [17]. Reikard et al. present test results about the accuracy of forecasting
models for ocean waveenergy [18].
Analyzingcharacteristicsof participantsin electricity markets
The characteristics of participants are one of the crucial factors to design mechanisms for electricity
markets. Regarding supply side, technologies for forecasting production are used for a stable supply
of electricity. Similarly, mechanism design must address the characteristics of consumers at demand
side. The insights of characteristics of consumers will improve the quality of mechanisms to induce
desirableactions from demand side.
To examine consumers’ behaviors, many studies consider modeling techniques about bounded
rationality, which explains behaviors that do not aim at maximizing bene ts [19]. For electricity
consumers, Ruiz et al. [20] present a game theoretical model to investigate the e ects of consumers’
switching costson competition of suppliers. Besides, Biglaiser et al. analyzethebene tsof suppliers
in amodel where consumers haveheterogeneous switching costs [21].
1.4 Problem statement
Thisthesisfocusesonproblemsinmodelingtechniquesfor analyzingconsumers’ bene tsin liberalized
electricity markets. Behavior and decision of demand-side are equally or even more important
than supply-side to deploy new technology even though many related studies have mainly focused
on technology and cost-e ectiveness of supply-side [22]. If proposed methods in this thesis can
obtain insights about consumers’ bene ts, the insights will contribute to the e ective mechanism
designof electricity marketssinceconsumersdemonstratevital rolesin liberalized electricity markets.
Moreover, methods to analyze the characteristics of consumers can be applied for both improving
current situations and examining future novel mechanisms of electricity markets. This thesis deals
with the following four problems about theanalysisof consumers’ bene ts.
Problem 1. Constructinga modelingframework for electricity trading
Structure of electricity markets has became complex after liberalization. Especially, the networked
structure will become important aspect since deregulation increases the number of participants in
electricity networks. For extensiveanalysisof bene ts for consumers in electricity trading, this thesis
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proposes amathematical modeling framework. Thisapproach is applied to electricity market models
for Problem 2, Problem 3, and Problem 4.
Problem 2. Representingelectricity trading in deregulated electricity markets
Thisproblemaimsat modelingparticipantsinderegulatedelectricity marketstoexaminethebene tsof
them. Sincetherearemultipletypesof participantsinthederegulatedelectricity markets, combinations
of electricity trading among participants increase than ever. This thesis focuses on representing
the deregulation of electricity retail since this kind of deregulation is closely related to electricity
consumers. This problem is the  rst application of the model considered in Problem 1 for modeling
bene ts, prices, and trading of market participants.
Problem 3. Examiningswitchingbehavior of consumersin electricity retail
As the third problem, this thesis proposes a market model focusing on switching costs to analyze the
behavior of consumersinelectricity retail markets. Enhanced understandingof theswitchingbehavior
is crucial to improve theswitching rateof consumers in electricity retail. Electricity retail markets in
many countriessee inactiveswitching behavior, which means theaction of consumers to changetheir
supplier. This topic aims at providing insights for promoting theswitching behavior of consumers by
modeling consumers’ decision making. This approach is di erent from that in Problem 2 since the
model in Problem 2 does not focus on thebehavior of each participant.
Problem 4. Describingfairnessamongprosumersin electricity sharing
The fourth problem de nes fairness measures for time-varying electricity sharing to decrease envy
among prosumers about their allocation of electricity. This study examines electricity trading among
prosumers, which has roles varying between suppliers or consumers from time to time. Electricity
consumersdo not necessarily act to maximizetheir bene tsasconsidered in Problem 3. Thisproblem
focuseson envy-freeness, which isoneof thefairnessmeasures for resourceallocation. Thismeasure
is selected since it is considered to be important even for irrational consumers. Since this problem




The remaining chapters of this thesis are structured as follows. Chapter 2 presents mathematical
modeling techniques for Problem 1 to represent electricity markets using graph theory. Chapter 3
proposesamarket model to describe thebene tsof participants in deregulated electricity markets for
Problem 2. Chapter 4 introducesamodel about Problem 3, which is to analyzetheswitching behavior
of consumers. Chapter 5 introduces a model to examine envy-free allocation in electricity sharing




Constructing a modeling framework for electricity
trading
This chapter introduces a mathematical modeling framework about trading in electricity markets for
Problem1. Firstly, relatedworksabout mathematical modelingareintroduced. Secondly, theproposed
mathematical modeling framework for electricity markets is explained.
2.1 Related works
2.1.1 Overview of mathematical modeling
Mathematical modeling isa fundamental concept to describeareal-world problem asamathematical
problem and to acquire a solution for the real-world problem [23]. In [24], Meerschaert explains the
process of mathematical modeling can bedescribed as5 step method. The5 step method includes the
following steps.
Step 1. Focus on a real-world problem
Step 2. De ne amathematical model from the real-world problem
Step 3. Formulatean optimization problem on themathematical model
Step 4. Solve theoptimization problem
Step 5. Consider the relation between theresults and the real-world problem
In this process, Step 5 is the most important step since the result of the formulated mathematical
problem cannot be considered for the real-world problem without Step 5.
One of the key objectives of mathematical modeling is to consider the characteristics of the real-
world problem. However, becausethereal-worldproblem iscomplex inmany cases, all characteristics
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cannot beincluded inasolvablemathematical problem. Hence, proposedmathematical modelsshould
focus on the limited number of characteristics of the real-world problem.
2.1.2 Research  eldsrelated tomathematical modeling
Electricity market models presented in this thesis are composed of several approaches used in Op-
erations Research (OR). As a research  eld to support appropriate decision making, OR deals with
mathematical modeling techniques for decision making in many industries. Mathematical modeling
in OR utilizesapproachesproposed in variousstudy areas: combinatorial optimization, graph theory,
game theory, economics, etc. The rest of this section introduces an overview of the main research
 elds related to mathematical models proposed in this thesis.
Combinatorial optimization
Many real-world problems can be formulated as abstract combinatorial optimization problems [25].
Thecombinatorial optimization problem isdescribed asaproblem to select optimal elements in aset.
Thefeasibility of computation for theproblems isdependent on their search space. If aproblem hasa
largesearchspace, relatively longer computation timeisrequired toobtainanoptimal solution. Hence,
the time complexity is important concepts to consider the computational e ciency of algorithms for
combinatorial optimization [26].
Graph theory
Graph theory is one of the mathematical modeling techniques to solve problems. In graph theory, a
graph is denoted by a set of vertices and edges. Many combinatorial optimization problems can be
modeled and solved by graph theoretic approaches such as network  ows, matching, and so on [27].
The complex structure and characteristics of electrical power networks have been represented and
analyzed by using graph theory [28, 29]. In addition to the applications for conventional electricity
grids, graph theory has been applied to methods for controlling futuresmart grids [30].
Recent applications on graph theory have focused on dynamical changes of the graph structure
even though graph theory has originally dealt with the static structure of graphs. Temporal network
theory appeared asan application of graph theory. Thetemporal network theory integratestimeseries
of graph structure into classical graph theory [31]. Temporal network is also known as Time-Varying
Graph (TVG) [32]. In studiesabout social networks, connectionsof vertices in agraph are focused on
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examining thecharacteristics of interactions among vertices (e.g. propagation of information, rumor,
epidemic, and so on [33].
Regarding algorithms to solve problems about graphs, machine learning techniques have been
adopted to improve the performance of the algorithms. In [34], Dai et al. introduce reinforcement
learning is utilized to design algorithms to solve graph problems. He et al. propose a learning
mechanism to improve branch-and-bound for mixed integer programs [35]. Although these studies
improve the performance of algorithms for graph problems, machine learning techniques in these
studies do not describe how real-world problems can be represented by graph problems. This thesis
mainly focuses on thedescription of real-world problems using graph theory.
Gametheory
Game theory analyzes the strategy of individuals in a situation where multiple players interact with
eachother. In [36], theconcept of gametheory isexplainedasfollows; “gametheory studiessituations
of competition and cooperation between several involved parties by using mathematical methods.” A
popular example of game theory is called prisoners’ dilemma. This game can be utilized to consider
the possible outcomes of each prisoner’s strategy (either cooperation or defect) by examining each
prisoner’sbene t determined by thecombination of thestrategies. Besides, evolutionary gametheory
is considered as an extension of game theory [36]. An evolutionary game mainly focuses on the
player’s population in dynamical systems. For example, the transition of the share of strategy in the
overall population is investigated by the techniques of evolutionary game theory.
Agent-based modeling
In agent-based modeling (ABM), a model of the real world is described by the set of autonomous
agents and interaction between them [37, 38, 39, 40]. By conducting simulations with ABM, the
behavior of a modeled system can be observed. One of the advantages of ABM simulations is the
observation for emergent behavior in a model [41]. As a consequence of micro interactions between
agents in a model, some macro features of the model are revealed by ABM simulations. Hence,
the ABM simulations are used as a complement for analytical methods traditionally used to analyze
real-world problems. If temporal networks and evolutionary games are mainly utilized to model
interactions of individuals, they might beconsidered as ABM.
Reinforcement learning in multi-agent simulation is expected to discover adaptive solutions for
10
problems that have uncertainty. However, although an agent learns appropriate actions against the
environment, theenvironment isdependent on other agents’ actions [42]. Hence, agentsaremoredif-
 cult to achievebetter actionsby reinforcement learning techniques through multi-agent environment
compared to reinforcement learning with asingleagent.
Social and economicnetwork
Social and economics network is a relatively new research  eld to investigate economic behavior in
a network representing a market [43]. This theory is also called network market [44]. Compared
to microeconomics, network market has one simple advantage; a typical market network is assumed
in a problem of network market. Ordinary microeconomics assumes an anonymous network as a
market. However, this assumption cannot match with the actual environment of markets. Hence,
network market isbetter in termsof theutilization of themarket structurecompared to theanonymous
network. This type of research  eld is also known as Agent-based Computational Economics (ACE)
[45].
Matchingand buyer-seller network
In 1962, Gale and Shapley discussed stable marriage problem and college admissions problem in
[46]. The stable marriage problem is a classic problem of matching, and this type of matching is
classi ed into one-to-onematching; moreover, when thenumber of elements isthesameon both sides
of matching, thematching iscalled perfect matching. An objectiveof thecollegeadmissionsproblem
is the construction of the matching between colleges and students. Colleges can accommodate some
students, and, ontheother hand, studentsmust belinked toonly onecollege; thus, thistypeof matching
is called many-to-one matching [47]. Thus, matching has variation according to modeling targets.
Matching market is a method for constructing the matching between sellers and buyers in a
networked market with a pricing mechanism [44, 48]. By changing the prices o ered by sellers in
a market model, demand of buyers in the model is changed, and the optimal distribution of sellers’
items is realized if thepricesof sellersareappropriate for buyers’ demand for the items. Thenetwork
structure used in matching market can be described as a buyer-seller network that is discussed in
[49, 50]. The utilization of buyer-seller network provides two advantages. First, a buyer can choose
a seller independently based on its evaluation to the seller, this is practical for the use in real markets
because the markets do not ever have the central coordination of the choice of buyers. Second, the
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e ciency of themarket can beexamined by social welfare, which is the total of utilitiesof all market
participants [51].
2.2 Mathematical modelingframework based on graph theory
Thissection explainsconcepts for mathematical modeling of electricity markets. After explaining the
basic notation of graph theory, this section proposes a modeling framework for electricity markets.
Thoughthissectionproposesconceptsof theframework, detailednotationspecializedfor eachproblem
of this thesis is de ned in subsequent chapters.
2.2.1 Fundamental conceptsof graph theory
Undirected and directed graph
An undirected graph G consists of two sets: node set N and edge set E. G can be represented by
G = (N, E). Nodes are also called vertices. Every edge in E exists between two nodes in N. For
instance, when E contains an edge between two nodes v and w, this edge can be denoted by (v, w) or
(w, v). Both (v, w) and (w, v) represent the same edge because every edge in E has no direction. Fig.
2.1a shows an example of undirected graph G. In this Fig., an edge between v1 and v4 is denoted by
(v1, v4) or (v4, v1).
A directed graph H iscomposed of anodeset N and an arc set A. H isrepresented by H = (N, A).
An arc in A can be considered as a directed edge in H. An arc from v to w is represented as (v, w).
Adversely, (w, v) denotes an arc with the direction opposite to (v, w). Fig. 2.1b is an example of
directed graph H. In Fig. 2.1b, an arrow between v4 and v2 represents an arc (v4, v2).
(a) Undirected graph. (b) Directed graph.
Fig. 2.1: Exampleof undirected graph and directed graph.
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(a) Undirected path (v2-v6 path). (b) Directed path (v2-v5 path).
Fig. 2.2: An undirected path and adirected path.
Path
In an undirected graph, a path is a sequence of edges. A path represents a route from the start node
to the terminal node. In the sequence of edges of a path, the same node must appear only once. If a
path has the start node s and the terminal node t, the path is called s-t path. In Fig. 2.2a, v2-v6 path
(v2  v1  v4  v3  v5  v6) is denoted by the dotted line. Of course, thenumber of v2-v6 paths in the
graph shown in Fig. 2.2a is not necessarily only one. For example, a path v2  v4  v3  v6 is also
v2-v6 path. On the other hand, there is no v2-v6 path in the directed graph in Fig. 2.2b since no path
can reach v6 from v2.
Degree
In graph theory, degree indicates the number of edges connected to a node. For undirected graphs,
degree of node v is simply denoted by deg(v). About a directed graph, two types of degree can be
considered: in-degree and out-degree. For example, degin(v) indicates in-degree of node v. Besides,
degout(v) denotes out-degree of node v.
Multipartitegraph
A multipartitegraph isagraph that consistsof n partitesetsof nodes[52]. For instance, for nodeset N
of multipartitegraph G, therearenodesetsNi (i = 1, 2, 3, ..., n) that satisfy N = N1∪N2∪N3∪...∪Nn.
There is no edge between two nodes which belong to the same partite set of nodes. Hence, v and w
must belong to thedi erent typeof nodeset each other about an arc (v, w) in a multipartitegraph.
A bipartitegraph hastwo typesof nodesetssinceabipartitegraph isamultipartitegraph in which
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(a) Undirected bipartitegraph. (b) Directed bipartitegraph.
Fig. 2.3: An undirected bipartitegraph and adirected bipartitegraph.
n = 2. For example, let Na and Nb betwo nodesetsof abipartitegraph. Thebipartitegraph hasnodes
ai ∈Na (i = 1, 2, ..., |Na|) and bj ∈Nb ( j = 1, 2, ..., |Nb|). Thus, an undirected bipartite graph has
edges represented by (ai, bj ) or (bj, ai ). Examples of undirected bipartitegraph and directed bipartite
graph are shown in Fig. 2.3.
2.2.2 Electricity market model represented by graphs
This thesis focuses on the following three aspects representing characteristics of trading in proposed
models of electricity markets.
1. Representing network structureamong market participants:
Asdescribed in Section 1, thenetworked structureevolving after thederegulation of electricity
markets has become an important aspect. Using graph theoretical concepts, themarket models
denote relationships of trading among participants in electricity markets.
2. Satisfying constraints on production and demand of electricity:
Production and demand of electricity must be balanced in electricity trading to realize a stable
supply of electricity to consumers. This thesis focuseson theconstraints on theproduction and
demand of market participants.
3. Describing bene ts for consumers in markets:
In the networked markets, consumers will face di  erent bene ts according to determined elec-
tricity trading since choices of consumers about suppliers increase than ever. Proposed market
models de ne the bene t of consumers from electricity trading in the networked structure
without violating theconstraints on theproduction and demand of electricity.
The rest of this section presents mathematical modeling concepts for each aspect as the modeling
framework.
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(a) One-to-one matching. (b) Many-to-one matching.
Fig. 2.4: Examples of matching.
1. Matching in buyer-seller networks
The concept of matching is used for the  rst aspect of electricity markets. A bipartite graph in Fig.
2.4a is a one-to-one matching but not a perfect matching because one node in the black nodes is not
assigned to any node in the white nodes; oppositely, a graph in Fig. 2.4b is a perfect one-to-one
matching. By using thebipartitegraph modelsof matchings, someresearchersconsider thematching
problems based on themethods of graph theory.
Even though both matching market and general economics deal with markets, matching market
does not use anonymous networks but given speci ed networks in which there are some buyers,
sellers, and links between them. Therefore, matching market shows how market participants a ect
eachother in thenetwork that hasthespeci ed structure, and thisattempt cannot berealized by general
economics using the anonymous networks. An ordinary method of matching market assumes that
sellersand buyers in amarket deal with asingle item, and an algorithm of matching market constructs
only perfect one-to-one matching.
2. Network  ows
As the second aspect of electricity markets, network  ow [53] can be utilized to determine resource
allocation in matching satisfying constraints on supply and demand of electricity. A directed graph
(V, A) is used in a network  ow problem. Arc (v, w) ∈A is a directed edge from v to w (v, w ∈V).
x(v, w) representsanonnegativevalueof  ow on (v, w) ∈A. c(v, w) denotesweight on arc (v, w). The
cost of  ow on arc (v, w) iscalculated by x(v, w) ꞏ c(v, w). Fig. 2.5 shows thenotation for thevalueof
 ow x(v, w) between v and w.
A directed path is a set of arcs, which represents a route from the source to the sink in a graph.




Fig. 2.5: Exampleof  ow model on arc (v, w).
w
x(o, v)
x(v, w) x(w, t)




Fig. 2.6: A samplemodel with two o-t paths.
meansapath which has thesource o and thesink t. For instance, Fig. 2.6 showsadirected graph that
has two o-t paths.
The main goal of a network  ow problem is to  nd  ows on o-t paths to optimize objective
functions (e.g. maximizing amounts of  ow, minimizing costs of  ow, and so on). In a network  ow
problem,  ow x(v, w) must satisfy two constraints. One of the constraints is the capacity constraint
on every arc in A, and the other is the mass-balance constraint on every node in V. For the capacity
constraint, every arc (v, w) ∈A hascapacity of  ow x(v, w). Let ub(v, w) and l b(v, w) beupper bound
and lower bound of x(v, w), respectively. As thecapacity constraint, x(v, w) must satisfy
l b(v, w)  x(v, w)  ub(v, w). (2.1)
Besides, di erence function d : V → R is utilized to de ne the mass-balance constraint. d(v)








In general, mass-balance constraint means d(v) = 0 except source and sink since structure of
sourceand sink aredi erent from theother nodes. let o and t represent sourceand sink, respectively.




x(o, w)  0  0. (2.3)
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Table2.1: Properties of abinary relation R.
Property Description
re exivity (sk, sk) ∈R
irre exivity (sk, sk) ! R
symmety skRsl ⇒ sl Rsk
asymmetry skRsl ⇒ sl Rcsk
transitivity skRsl and sl Rsm ⇒ skRsm
intransitivity skRsl and sl Rsm ⇒ skRcsm
completeness (sk, sl ) ∈R or (sl, sk) ∈R
Moreover, d(t) must satisfy
d(t) = 0  
#
{w:(w,t)∈A}
x(w, t)  0. (2.4)
For example, in the directed graph shown in Fig. 2.6, (2.2) must be satis ed in d(v), d(w), and d(u).
Likewise, (2.3) and (2.4) must besatis ed in d(o) and d(t), respectively.
3. Preference relation and utility function
The third aspect of electricity markets, which is to describe bene ts for consumers, is represented
by using concepts of preference and utility. Preference relation describes preference of a market
participant over itsalternativestochose. For instance, let buyer bj chooseseller si based on preference
over its alternatives of sellers. bj is likely to choose an alternative that is more preferred than
the current seller. The preference of bj over every pair of alternatives sk, sl ∈Xj is expressed as
preference relation, which is based on binary relation. Binary relation R is a subset of Cartesian
product Xj ×Xj . For sk, sl ∈Xj , let (sk, sl ) ∈Xj ×Xj be a pair of alternatives. R can be denoted as
R = {(sk, sl ) | sk, sl ∈Xj } . Let skRsl be (sk, sl ) ∈R, and skRcsl denote (sk, sl ) ! R. R has properties
shown in Table 2.1 based on (sk, sl ) contained in R. In Table 2.1, sk, sl, sm are alternatives arbitrarily
chosen from Xj .
Utility function isused asametric to represent thebene t of aparticipant inamodel. For instance,
utility of buyer bj to choose alternative si is calculated by a utility function µj : Xj → R. Utility
function and preference relation are related each other. Considering P and I over the same set Xj ,
preference relation is rational if P ∪I meets completeness and transitivity. Furthermore, if P ∪I
satis estransitivity, each of P and I isalso transitive. When preferencerelation isrational, preference
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relation can bede ned by using utility function µj as follows.
skPsl  ⇒ µj (sk) > µj (sl ).
Although µj (si ) might contain many types of factors to determine utility obtained from each
alternative, this thesis focuses on electricity charges as the factor of utility. Electricity is an almost
homogeneousproduct since thefunction of electricity doesnot di er with suppliers from consumers’
point of view [54, 55]. In general, the main factor for a comparison of homogeneous products is the
charge of products. The de nition of utility function is also based on the charge of product in game
theory in somecases [56].
In addition to electricity charges, the other factors of consumers’ utility can also be considered
such as theenvironmental e ects of energy sources, reliability of electricity supply, and so on.
• Rowlands et al. investigated several factors of consumers’ decision making about choosing
electricity suppliers [57]. Their results indicate consumers recognized electricity charges and
environmental e ectsasimportant factors. Someelectricity consumersprefer renewableenergy
due to itssmaller environmental e ects. Although consumers who prefer renewableenergy are
possibly willing to pay higher costs than conventional plants, theconsumers’ willingnessto pay
for renewableenergy di  ers across countries [58].
• Some consumers might feel anxious about the reliability of new retailers in the markets. The
consumers are willing to pay costs to avoid electric outages [59]. However, the reliability is
not di erent across retailers if divisions for managing stable electricity supply have not been
deregulated even after the liberalization of electricity retail (for example in Japan) [60].
Hence, this thesis assumes electricity charges are considered to be the common characteristics of
consumers’ utility compared to environmental e ectsand reliability described above. In other words,
this thesis mainly focuses on economic bene ts in the de nition of utility functions in proposed
electricity market models.
Utility function µj (si ) can be used to represent the concept of consumer surplus widely used in
microeconomics. Let vj represent reservation price, which is willingness to pay of bj for purchasing
electricity from si . Besides, let pi be an electricity price o ered by si for one unit of electricity. If bj
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purchases dj units of electricity, µj (si ) is determined as follows in our modeling framework.





Using network  ow, dj can be determined by the amount of  ow between bj and sj in electricity
trading. Since the amount of network  ow must satisfy constraints on production and demand of
electricity, network  ow can beutilized to determinedj without violating theconstraintson electricity
trading. Although utility functions de ned in subsequent chapters are specialized for each problem,
the values given by theutility functions commonly represent the bene t of consumers in matching in
proposed market models.
2.3 Summary of thischapter
Thischapter introducesamathematical modeling framework to represent trading inelectricity markets
as an extension of the concept of matching market. By using concepts of graph theory, relationships
about trading among market participants (e.g. suppliers, consumers) can be described. Network
 ow can denote the quantity of supply and demand of electricity in trading. Furthermore, as a
method considered in social and economic networks, utility function can describe thebene tsof each
participant in electricity trading. This chapter explains the concepts of the modeling framework, and
solutions for Problem 2, Problem 3, and Problem 4 are considered in the subsequent chapters based
on theproposed modeling framework.
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Chapter 3
Representing electricity trading in deregulated
electricity markets
This chapter introduces amathematical modeling technique regarding Problem 2. In thischapter, the




Numerous studies have been conducted to consider modeling techniques for deregulated electricity
markets [61, 62]. Grine et al. present a multi-layer model to consider electricity prices with another
energy commodity [63]. Triki et al. consider an optimal capacity allocation problem to maximize
pro ts of electricity sellers [64]. Hussein et al. formulate an optimization problem for forecasting
prices in day-ahead electricity markets [65]. Corchero et al. present astochastic programming model
for theSpanish electricity market [66].
Moreover, there are various studies on e ciency, which means the optimal allocation of the
electricity with appropriate prices [67]. E ciency can be measured by social welfare that is the sum
of payo s of all market participants [68]. Stern et al. consider the relation between market clearing
price mechanisms and the maximization of social welfare in deregulated electricity markets [69].
Mechanism designs to maximize social welfare in double-sided electricity markets are presented in
[70, 71]. Nicolaisen et al. propose a price setting problem in a double-price auction for wholesale
markets by implementing a reinforcement learning algorithm [72]. Swami considers social welfare
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maximization with considering congestion of transmission lines[51]. Asoneof theresearch topicson
market e ciency, network market based ongraph theory isproposed in [49]. Thismodel isconsidered
to be more realistic than anonymous networks because actual trades occur between participants that
can interact with each other. Since electricity trades also take place between participants connected
by transmission lines, we proposed an algorithm to  nd optimal matchings in an electricity market
model based on network market [73].
However, thepreviousworkshavenot focused on electricity retailers, becausethepreviousmarket
models contain only suppliers and consumers, not a retailer. In [74], Babic notes advantages of an
agent-based modeling technique for electricity retail markets; however, no characteristics regarding
retailers are demonstrated in the thesis. To model activities of retailers in network markets, Blume
et al. considers optimal price setting on a tripartite graph by utilizing a game theoretical approach
[75]. However, the method cannot deal with a multi-unit commodity such as electricity because
it is assumed that participants trade only a single-unit commodity. Besides, Nava introduces the
competition model utilizing network  ows in oligopolistic markets [76]. Although themodel of Nava
can cope with participants including retailers dealing with multi-unit commodities, the model cannot
beapplied to electricity marketsbecausetherolesof participantsin electricity marketsaredetermined
beforeequilibrium prices are discovered.
3.1.2 Contribution
This thesis proposes a sequential solution method to determine prices and e cient trades in an
electricity market model with electricity retailers. In this thesis, we formulated a determination
problem for e cient electricity trades on a model with electricity as a multi-unit commodity, not a
single-unit commodity. Tosolvetheproblem, weconstructed thesequential solutionmethod tochoose
electricity trades in the market model. In our solution method, a price setting algorithm extended
from a price setting mechanism proposed in [75]. Moreover, to determine electricity trades on the
model, a determination problem is formulated by utilizing integer programming and unsplittable
 ow [77]. Simulation results demonstrate the characteristics in deregulated electricity markets about
e ciency in terms of social welfare and payo allocation of each market participant. Although the
simulation resultsabout e ciency aresimilar to theresult presented in [78], theparameter conditions
about capacity of electricity sellers are di erent in this thesis. Moreover, the results regarding payo 
allocation indicate that important factors for the payo allocation are the market structure and the
21
period of timehaving elapsed since thederegulation.
3.2 Electricity market model with agents
Thissection introduces our electricity market model based on graph theory. Themodel denotes three
types of agents and electricity trades conducted between them.
3.2.1 Tripartite network representingelectricity markets
Our electricity market model is represented by tripartitenetwork G = (S∪B ∪T, A). Fig. 3.1 shows










Fig. 3.1: Tripartitenetwork G composed of agents.
tk ∈T. Each arc indicates that agents at endpoints of the arc can conduct electricity trades between
them. Arc set A contains arcs (si, tk) or (tk, bj ) due to following threeconstraints.
1. Each arc connects two agents not belonging to thesame typeof agents.
2. bj must beprovided electricity from tk.
3. tk must purchaseelectricity from si .
3.2.2 Notation of electricity  ow on market model
In themodel, each seller hasacapacity of electricity, and each buyer hasademand of electricity. The
capacity of si and the demand of bj are denoted by csi and d
b
j respectively. Let cmin be the minimum
capacity of all csi , and let dmin be the minimum demand of all bj . Since a seller in our model can
supply electricity to at least onebuyer viaa trader, cmin must satisfy cmin  dmin.
To denoteelectricity trades in themodel, thenotation of network  ow isutilized. Integer x(b, a) is
























































Fig. 3.4: Flow constraints on arcs in G.
by l b(b, a) and ub(b, a), respectively. If x(b, a) > 0, electricity currents on (b, a); otherwise, there is
no electricity  ow on (b, a).
In addition, unsplittable  ow is utilized to avoid determining complicated electricity trades satis-
fying the demand of a buyer. In Fig. 3.2 and 3.3, solid arcs represent electricity  ow to satisfy db3.
Electricity  ow in Fig. 3.2 is considered as splittable  ow. The type of  ow in Fig. 3.3 is called
unsplittable  ow. Only one s2-b3 path is selected as unsplittable  ow, and splittable  ow adversely
needs a larger number of arcs than unsplittable  ow. Hence, our model uses unsplittable  ow to
determineelectricity trades with asimplestructure.
Unsplittable  ow is realized by  ow constraints on the model. si can supply electricity  ow
up to csi . There is no electricity  ow if si does not trade any electricity. Hence, l b(si, tk) = 0, and
ub(si, tk) = csi . Besides, bj purchasesdj unitsof electricity, and  ow constraintson (tk, bj ) aredenoted
by l b(tk, bj ) = dbj and ub(tk, bj ) = d
b
j . Fig. 3.4 indicates thesecapacity constraints.
3.3 Price settinggameon market model
Agentsin themodel haveproperty called valuation and payo . Theproperty isutilized in mechanisms





k ,i  k ,j : Bid price offer
: Ask price offer
Fig. 3.5: Ask and bid prices.
3.3.1 Valuation and trade value
Electricity prices o ered by traders are determined by a price setting game. Each seller and buyer in
themodel hasvaluation, which describes theutility for trading oneunit of electricity. vbj indicates the
valuation of bj for purchasing one unit of electricity. vsi denotes the valuation of si for supplying one
unit of electricity. Thesets of each valuation are de ned by
vs =
$











Electricity trades occur between seller si and buyer bj via trader tk. About the electricity trades
among them, each agent obtains payo . The total of the payo regarding the trade is called trade
value. Since we assume that costs for supplying electricity through arcs between si and bj are zero








When tk conducts a trade between bj and si , tk has its own strategy denoted by (αk, j, βk,i ). This
strategy consists of two types of prices called ask price αk, j and bid price βk,i . tk o ers αk, j to bj
adjacent to tk. Besides, βk,i is o ered to si adjacent to tk. In Fig. 3.5, tk o ers αk, j to bj and βk,i to
si . Since there will be traders who lost money if βk,i > αk, j , the strategy of tk must be a no-crossing
strategy [79] represented by βk,i  αk, j .
3.3.2 Payo of each participant
bj must purchase dbj unitsof electricity from oneof thetraders to satisfy itsdemand. Thepayo of bj
for trading with tk can bedenoted by the following utility function µj (tk).
µj (tk) =
(
vbj  αk, j
)
dbj . (3.2)
Since this chapter assumes each buyer purchases electricity from only one trader, the total payo 
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Fig. 3.6: Trade valueand payo s of agents.





= µj (tk). (3.3)
About sellers, si is o ered βk,i by tk. To provide electricity, si will choose tk o ering βk,i that
maximizespayo of si . Payo of si for supplying dbj unitsof electricity to bj through tk isdenoted by
µ
!







si can provideelectricity to oneor morebuyers if the total of demandsdo not exceed csi . Therefore, si
can obtain the total payo represented by
P (si ) =
#
(tk,bj )∈pair (si )
µ
!
si, (k, j )
"
, (3.5)
where pair (si ) denotes theset of pairs of bj and tk provided electricity from si .
tk obtains payo for trading dbj unitsof electricity between si and bj , which is denoted by
µ
!




αk, j  βk,i
"
dbj . (3.6)
Let S(tk) be theset of si adjacent to tk, and let B(tk) be theset of bj adjacent to tk. The total payo of
tk is represented by
P (tk) =
#
si ∈S(tk),bj ∈B(tk )
µ
!
tk, (i, j )
"
xk,i, j . (3.7)
Fig. 3.6 shows the relation between the trade value and payo sof si , tk, and bj .
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Algorithm 1 Pricesetting (G, vs, vb, λ)
for j ← 1 to |B| do
if |adj (bj )| = 1 then
q(bj ) = 0.
else
Find ŝi with theminimum valuation v̂si .
q(bj ) = (vbj  v̂
s
i )λ.
while q(bj ) = (vbj  v́
s









for i ← 1 to |S| do
if |adj (si )| = 1 then
q(si ) = 0.
else
Find b̂j with themaximum valuation v̂bj .
q(si ) = (v̂bj  v
s
i )λ.
while q(si ) = (v́bj  v
s









for k ← 1 to |T | do
return αk, j = vbj  q(bj ) (bj ∈B(tk)).
return βk,i = vsi + q(si ) (si ∈S(tk)).
end for
3.4 Procedure todetermine electricity trades
To determine electricity trades on the model, we propose a sequential solution method. The method
 rstly calculates equilibrium electricity prices, and then the method determines electricity trades by
using theprices.
3.4.1 Price settingalgorithm
Algorithm 1 showsapricesetting algorithm that calculatesequilibrium prices. In thisalgorithm, each
seller and buyer discovers its maximum payo for trading electricity by considering the valuation of
the other agents. This algorithm is based on price setting mechanism explained in [75]. We extend
the algorithm to adjust payo s of participants for ensuring no participant exclusively obtains larger
payo than other agents.
The process of Algorithm 1 is as follows. First, each buyer bj ∈B calculates q(bj ), which is the
payo of bj for trading oneunit of electricity. q(bj ) isused to obtain ask pricesαk, j . For all a ∈S∪B,
let adj (a) be the set of tk connected to a. If |adj (bj ) = 1|, there is only one trader tk adjacent to bj .
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There is no competition between bj and tk in this case, and thus q(bj ) = 0. If |adj (bj ) > 1|, two or
more traders tk are connected to bj . Let ŝi be aseller adjacent to tk ∈adj (bj ). ŝi has thevaluation v̂si
that is theminimum in thevaluation of sellersadjacent to tk ∈adj (bj ). In our pricesetting algorithm,
a real number λ(0 < λ 0.5) is incorporated into thealgorithm as aparameter that is used to adjust
payo s of sellers and buyers. The range of λis set to realize the no-crossing strategy, explained in
Section 3.3.1. With this notation, q(bj ) is  rstly set as q(bj ) = (vbj  v̂
s
i )λ. Then, q(bj ) is decreased
until q(bj ) becomesequal to (vbj  v́
s
i )λ, where śi " ŝi isoneof thesellersadjacent to tk ∈adj (bj ) and
has valuation v́si  v̂
s
i .
Second, each seller si ∈S determines q(si ), which is the payo of si for trading one unit of
electricity. By setting q(si ), bid prices βk,i can bedetermined. Theprocess to set q(si ) issimilar to the
process to calculate q(bj ). If |adj (si ) = 1|, there is no competition between si and tk, and q(si ) = 0.
If |adj (si ) > 1|, let b̂j be a seller adjacent to tk ∈adj (si ), and b̂j has the valuation v̂bj that is the
maximum in the valuation of buyers adjacent to tk ∈adj (si ). q(si ) is  rstly set as q(si ) = (v̂bj  v
s
i )λ.
Then, q(si ) is increased until q(si ) becomes equal to (v́bj  v
s
i )λ, where b́j " b̂j is one of the buyers
adjacent to tk ∈adj (si ) and has valuation v́bj  v̂
b
j .
Finally, ask priceαk, j and bid price βk,i of each trader tk areset based on q(bj ) and q(si ) for all bj
and si . These ask and bid prices  nally determined areequilibrium prices on themarket model.
3.4.2 Optimization problem for trade determination
Maximization of payo for each trader
To determine electricity trades, each trader solves a maximization problem of payo by using prices
calculated by Algorithm 1. In this problem, trades are greedily chosen by each trader to maximize
its payo . This problem is formulated as an integer program similar to the generalized assignment
problem [80].
Themaximization problem isformulated as follows. Let xk,i, j ∈[0, 1] denote theelectricity trades
on si -bj path via tk. xk,i, j = 1 means electricity trades are conducted on the si -bj path. Adversely,
trades on the si -bj path is not conducted if xk,i, j = 0. The condition of network  ow on the model
determines xk,i, j , and thecondition is represented by
xk,i, j =
    













By using xk,i, j and µ
!
tk, (i, j )
"




si ∈S(tk),bj ∈B(tk )
µ
!
tk, (i, j )
"
xk,i, j . (3.8)
0  xk,i, j  1,
µ
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In (3.8), xk,i, j = 1 means trades on si -bj path are selected to maximizepayo of tk.
Tradessatisfyingall capacity and demand
Even though every trader determines all trades by (3.8), demands for somesellers might exceed their
own capacity. This situation means some consumers cannot purchase electricity from a seller who
doesnot haveenough capacity to satisfy all demands. Hence, electricity trades satisfying all capacity
and demand should be independently chosen from theelectricity trades which each trader selected by
solving (3.8). To choosetheelectricity tradesconsidering capacity, amaximization problem of social
welfare isutilized in this thesis.
To describe the maximization problem, a maximum unsplittable  ow problem is utilized. In the
problem, bipartite network Gbi = (S∪B, Abi) is constructed. Arc set Abi corresponds to the set of
possible trades xt. Thus, for all tk ∈T, Abi contains (si, bj ) if xk,i, j = 1 in (3.8). The capacity of  ow
on (si, bj ) is denoted by 0  xi, j  1. si can supply  ow up to csi , and demand of  ow of bj is d
b
j .




xi, j wi, j . (3.9)
xi, j  0,
.
si ∈adj (bj ) xi, j  1,
.






3.4.3 Overall procedure for trade determination
The overall procedure of our solution method to determine e cient trades is described in Procedure
1. First, equilibrium prices are calculated by Algorithm 1. Then, every trader discovers trades
maximizing payo of the trader. After that, e cient trades xt will bedetermined in all trades that the
traders want to conduct. Finally, social welfareW(xt) can becalculated.
Procedure1 tradedetermination
Input: G, vs, vb, λ.
Output: W(xt ), xt ,.
Four stepsof the procedure:
1. Price setting (G, vs, vb, λ).
2. For all tk, determine xk,i, j (si ∈S(tk), bj ∈B(tk)) by (3.8).
3. Construct Gbi by using xk,i, j (tk ∈T, si ∈S, bj ∈B).
4. Obtain W(xt ) and xt by solving (3.9) with Gbi.
3.5 Market participantsassigned to model
By setting conditions of the network and agents in the model, four types of market participants can
be considered. Those participants can be utilized to reveal characteristics of deregulated electricity
markets.
3.5.1 Participantsin deregulated electricity markets
In this thesis, a day-ahead electricity market is focused on as deregulated electricity markets. Prices
in the day-ahead markets are determined hourly or half hourly [81]. Participants supposed in this
thesis are classi ed into four types: the public utility, independent power producers, retailers, and
consumers. Theparticipants are described by agents explained in Section 3.2.1.
1. Public utility (PU) conducts electricity generation and supply. The PU is a large  rm that has
conducted generation and supply since themarket was regulated. In thederegulated market, the
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PU can purchase electricity from another generator. The PU is denoted by a pair of seller and
trader.
2. Retailer (R) conducts electricity trades with consumers. A retailer is described by one pair of a
trader and aseller if the retailer has its own generator. Otherwise, one trader denotes a retailer.
3. Independent power producer (I PP) has its own generator to sell its electricity to customers. An
IPP is assigned to oneof thesellers, and it can supply electricity to PU and retailers.
4. Consumer (C) is an end-user of electricity. A consumer purchases electricity from one of the
best suppliers connected to theconsumer. Theconsumer is assigned to oneof thebuyers.
3.5.2 Constraintson network structure
To describe market participants, network G is constructed with following constraints. G has only
one PU, and PU is connected to all consumers in G since PU existed in an electricity market before
deregulation. The market model contains some IPP and retailers that have newly joined the market
after deregulation. For simplicity, themodel contains thesamenumber of IPPand retailers. Each IPP
is connected to all retailers and PU.
After the deregulation, a consumer cannot choose a retailer if the consumer does not know
the retailer. To describe this situation, R is connected to C with the probability represented by
pr ob(R,C) ∈(0, 1]. If pr ob(R, C) = 1, all arcs between retailers and a consumer are constructed. As
thetimehaselapsed sincethederegulation, each consumer will increasethenumber of retailerswhich
the consumer know. Hence, long time has passed since the deregulation if pr ob(R, C) is high. Fig.
3.7 and Fig. 3.8 show example models with pr ob(R,C) = 0.2 and pr ob(R,C) = 0.8, respectively. In
these  gures, R′and R denote seller si and trader tk of a retailer respectively. Besides, PU′and PU
represent si and tk of PU respectively in the  gures.
3.5.3 Constraintson parametersof participants
The capacity of newly joining participants, such as IPP and retailers, is relatively lower than the
capacity of PU in deregulated electricity markets. The capacity of PU is enough to supply electricity
to all consumers since PU was responsible for electricity supply before deregulation. In this thesis,
capacity of sellers is set according to the following constraint.














































Fig. 3.8: Samplemodel with pr ob(R,C) = 0.8.
With regard to valuation of sellers, newly joining participantshavelower valuation than PU in this
thesis. Thisconditionmeansnewly joiningparticipantscan o er low-cost electricity thanPU. Besides,
valuation of all buyers is  xed to the same value for simplicity. The valuation of buyers is enough to
purchase electricity from any sellers. Following constraint indicates theconditions described above.
vR < vI PP < vPU < vC. (3.11)
3.5.4 Metricsindicatingcharacteristicsof markets
To evaluate trades determined by our method, two kinds of themetrics are considered in this thesis.
E ciency rate
AlthoughW(xt) isthemaximum social welfareon Gbi, W(xt) doesnot necessarily correspond toW(x)
that istheupper bound of social welfareon G. W(x) can beobtained by constructing bipartitenetwork
G′bi = (S∪B, A
′
bi) from G. A
′
bi is the set of possible trades x on G
′
bi . If si can trade with bj through
at least one trader in G, arc set A′bi contains an arc (si, bj ). With G
′





xi, j wi, j . (3.12)
0  xi, j  1,
wi, j  0,
.






Table3.1: Payo of market participants and agents.
Participant Agent Payo of participant
PU si and tk P(PU) = P(si ) + P(tk).
R si and tk P(R) = P(si ) + P(tk).
I PP si P(I PP) = P(si ).
C bj P(C) = P(bj ).
W(xt) isnot necessarily thesameasW(x) sincethecalculationof W(x) doesnot consider electricity
pricesetting. However, thedi erencebetweenW(xt) andW(x) shouldbesmall tokeephighe ciency.
Hence, theperformanceregarding e ciency of our sequential method can beevaluated by comparing
W(xt) withW(x). ThecomparisonbetweenW(xt) andW(x) can beconducted by examining E ciency







In regulated electricity markets, PU is responsible for providing electricity to consumers. Hence, PU
exclusively obtainspayo for supplying electricity. On theother hand, payo for providing electricity
is also allocated to newly joining market participants in deregulated electricity markets. Therefore, it
is important to analyzewho can acquirehow much payo to tradeelectricity in deregulated electricity
markets.
In this thesis, Payo Rate (PR) isutilized to indicate therateof payo of each participant in social
welfare. The payo of each participant can be described by using the payo of agents. Table 3.1
showstherelation between thepayo of each participant and agents. In Table3.1, P(a) denotespayo 








This section demonstrates simulation results of our sequential solution method. After simulation
conditions are introduced, results regarding e ciency rateand payo rate are presented.
Table 3.2: Conditionsof parameters in simulations.
Parameter Assigned value
# of agents |S|=5 or 7, |T |=3 or 5, |B|=10,15, or 30.
# of participants (|S|=5) PU: 1, R: 2, IPP: 2, C : 10, 15, or 30.
# of participants (|S|=7) PU: 1, R: 4, IPP: 4, C : 10, 15, or 30.
vbj 20 for all bj .
vsi (|S| = 5) v
s
1 = 10, v
s
2 = 4, v
s
3 = 3, v
s
4 = 9, v
s
5 = 8.
vsi (|S| = 7) v
s
1 = 10, v
s
2 = 4, v
s
3 = 3, v
s
4 = 2, v
s
5 = 9, v
s





j = j .
λ 0.25
pr ob(R,C) 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9, 1.0.
Iteration 100
3.6.1 Conditions
For conducting simulationsof tradedetermination, asimulationsoftwarefor our model wasdeveloped
with Java and lp_solve, which is an integer programming solver. Simulation experiments were
conducted with the condition described in Table 3.2. In the simulations, we assumed that each
consumer has the unique demand of electricity. Hence, the index of each consumer is set as the
 xed demand of theconsumer since the index is unique to each consumer. Since themodel structure
depends on pr ob(R,C), 100 times of iterations for every pr ob(R,C) and CPwereconducted.
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Table3.3: Capacity pattern (|B| = 10, 15, 30).
|B | 10
CP 1 2 3 4 5
PU 55 55 55 55 55
I PP 3 6 13 27 31
R 1 2 6 18 69
|B | 15
CP 1 2 3 4 5
PU 120 120 120 120 120
I PP 7 15 30 60 84
R 1 4 13 40 69
|B | 30
CP 1 2 3 4 5
PU 465 465 465 465 465
I PP 29 58 116 232 328
R 5 17 51 155 268
In deregulated electricity markets, newly joining participantsexpandstheir capacity for electricity
supply as the time elapses. Hence, di erent types of capacity of newly joining participants were set
in the simulations. Table 3.3 shows Capacity Patterns (CP), which are the conditions of capacity
of each seller. CP 1 indicates newly joining participants do not have large capacity because not a
long period has elapsed since the start of deregulation. In CP 2, more periods of time have passed
after the deregulation than CP 1, and the di  erence of capacity between market participants became
smaller than CP 1. In CP 3, 4, and 5, newly joining participants got more capacity as the index of
CP increases. For all CP, capacity of PU is is equal to the total of all demands, and all consumer can
purchase electricity from PU as theworst choice.
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Table3.4: Ask and bid prices obtained in asimulation.
(si , tk ) vsi βk , i
(PU ′, PU ) 10.00 10.00
(R′1, R1) 4.00 4.00
(R′2, R2) 3.00 3.00
(I PP1, PU ) 9.00 12.67
(I PP1, R1) 9.00 12.67
(I PP1, R2) 9.00 12.67
(I PP2, PU ) 8.00 12.00
(I PP2, R1) 8.00 12.00
(I PP2, R2) 8.00 12.00
(tk, b j ) vbj αk , j
(PU, C1) 20.00 14.67
(PU, C2) 20.00 16.00
(PU, C3) 20.00 16.00
(PU, C4) 20.00 16.00
(PU, C5) 20.00 16.00
(PU, C6) 20.00 16.00
(PU, C7) 20.00 14.67
(PU, C8) 20.00 16.00
(PU, C9) 20.00 16.00
(PU, C10) 20.00 16.00
(tk , b j ) vbj αk, j
(R1, C1) 20.00 14.67
(R1, C2) 20.00 16.00
(R1, C4) 20.00 16.00
(R1, C7) 20.00 14.67
(R1, C9) 20.00 16.00
(R1, C10) 20.00 16.00
(tk , b j ) vbj αk, j
(R2, C1) 20.00 14.67
(R2, C3) 20.00 16.00
(R2, C5) 20.00 16.00
(R2, C6) 20.00 16.00
(R2, C7) 20.00 14.67























Fig. 3.9: Determined trades on G.
3.6.2 Resultsand discussion
Determined electricity trades
First, the result of one of the iterations is focused on to examine determined electricity trades. In this
result, pr ob(R,C) = 0.3, and CP 3 was selected. Table 3.4 represents ask and bid prices determined
by Algorithm 1. All bid price βk,i weremore than valuation vsi . Moreover, all ask price αk, j were less
than valuation vbj . Based on the prices shown in Table 3.4, Procedure 1 determined electricity trades





tk, (i, j )
"
and wi, j of each determined trade.
Determined trade µ
!
tk, (i, j )
"
wi, j dbj wi, j d
b
j
R′2  R2  C1 11.67 17 1 17
R′1  R1  C2 12.00 16 2 32
R′2  R2  C3 13.00 17 3 51
R′1  R1  C4 12.00 16 4 64
I PP1  R2  C5 3.33 11 5 55
I PP2  PU  C6 4.0 12 6 72
I PP2  R2  C7 2.67 12 7 84
I PP1  R2  C8 3.33 11 8 88
PU′ PU  C9 6.00 10 9 90
PU′ PU  C10 6.00 10 10 100
W(xt ) 653





















tk, (i, j )
"
and tradevaluewi, j for eachdeterminedtrade. The rst columnat Table
3.5 representsdetermined tradesdescribedby thenotationsuchassi  tk  bj . Sinceµ
!
tk, (i, j )
"
 0 for
all tk, no-crossing tradeswereconducted in thissimulation. In termsof social welfare, W(xt) = 653.0,
and W(x) = 667.0. Therefore, ER(xt, x) = 97.9 % in this example. More detailed analysis on
ER(xt, x) ispresented in Section 3.6.2.
Table 3.6 shows PR of each participant in the simulation. As shown in Table 3.6, no participant
obtainszero payo sandacquiresalot of payo sexclusively. Allocationof PRof PU, IPP, and retailers
varied in each iteration since the number of trades that each participant involves in each iteration is





























Fig. 3.10: Averageof e ciency rate (|S| = 5, |B| = 10).
Analysisregardinge ciency rate
Our sequential solution method demonstrated high ER in thesimulation. Fig. 3.10 shows theaverage
of ER(xt, x) in the simulation with the model in which |S| = 5 and |B| = 10. In Fig. 3.10, the
horizontal axis denotes pr ob(R, C), and the vertical axis corresponds to the average of ER(xt, x) in
the simulation. The average of ER(xt, x) was larger than 90 % for all pr ob(R,C) and CP. This result
shows our solution method can be used to determine e cient trades of a multi-unit commodity such
as electricity.
For all CP, the average of ER became small as pr ob(R,C) increased. The reason for this decline
might relate to the number of possible trades on G. If pr ob(R,C) is high, each trader has a larger
number of possible trades on G. In this condition, however, demands of traders concentrate on
participants providing inexpensive electricity. Hence, our method determines trades satisfying all
capacity and demand, and thisdetermined trades demonstrates relatively lower ER.
Regarding CP, high ER was obtained when the capacity of IPP and retailers is relatively lower
than PU. Adversely, ER becameworsewhen thedi  erenceof capacity of participantsbecamesmaller.
Newly joining participantsalso have largecapacity similar to PU with CP5. Hence, many consumers






















































Figure 1: Standard deviat ion of payo rate (|S| = 7).
1
Fig. 3.11: Payo rateof each participants with each CP.
Analysisregardingpayo rate
Therelationbetweenpayo allocationandstructureof market network wereexaminedby investigating
PRof market participants. First, Fig. 3.11showssimulation result about PRof eachmarket participant
for each CP. In Fig. 3.11, the horizontal axis corresponds to the name of each participant, and the
vertical axis indicates PR of each participant. The parameters of G in this simulation were set to
|S| = 5, |B| = 10, and pr ob(R,C) = 0.5. Large part of PR was exclusively allocated to PU for CP 1.
For CP 2, PR of the PU decreased, and PR of newly joining participants increased. Furthermore, for
CP3, PR was fairly allocated to market participantscompared to other CP. However, largepart of PR
was adversely allocated to retailers for CP 4 and 5. Hence, if the valuation of market participants has
been  xed to the same value, large part of PR is exclusively allocated to retailers obtaining enough










































































































(c) |B| = 30.









































































































(c) |B| = 30.
Fig. 3.13: Standard deviation of payo rate (|S| = 7).
For examining the characteristics of PR with various structures of G, the standard deviation of
PR was analyzed. The standard deviation of PR indicates whether payo allocation is fair or not.
For instance, large standard deviation means payo is not allocated to participants evenly. Fig. 3.12
indicates thestandard deviation of PR with |S| = 5. Each of Fig. 3.12 (a), (b), and (c) show theresult
with the di erent setting of |B|. The horizontal axis denotes pr ob(R,C), and the vertical axis shows
the average of the standard deviation of PR in the 100 iterations. In terms of CP, Fig. 3.12 indicates
similar characteristics found in Fig. 3.11. The smallest standard deviation was obtained with CP 3,
and thestandard deviation became high with CP 1 and CP5.
With regard to the axis denoting pr ob(R,C), the number of buyers |B| a ected variation of the
standard deviation. In Fig. 3.12 (a), the standard deviation varies widely as pr ob(R,C) increases.
The variation of the standard deviation in Fig. 3.12 (b) is smaller than that of Fig. 3.12 (a). Besides,
the standard deviation of Fig. 3.12 (c) almost remains stable. Hence, the dispersion of the standard
deviation of PR will becomestable if thenumber of buyers increases.
Fig. 3.13 also demonstrated thecharacteristicsshown in Fig. 3.12. Since |S| = 7 in Fig. 3.13, the
number of sellers is larger than that of Fig. 3.12. The standard deviation in Fig. 3.13 is smaller than
that in Fig. 3.12. These results indicate thevariation of PR will decrease if there isa largenumber of
sellers in themodel.
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3.7 Summary of thischapter
Regarding deregulated electricity markets, this chapter proposed a market model to describe the
bene tsof market participantsandasequential solutionmethod todeterminee cient electricity trades
in the model. Social welfare and payo allocation on the electricity market model were investigated
by conducting simulation experiments. About the consumers’ choice over suppliers in simulation,
however, demonstrated thedi erencecompared to general situationsof electricity retail marketssince
simulation results indicated many consumerschoseasupplier that isnot thePU. Chapter 4 re nes the
electricity market model for theanalysisof theconsumers’ choiceof suppliers. Furthermore, Chapter
5 will integrate theconcepts of thedynamical transition of production and consumption of electricity






This chapter introduces a mathematical modeling technique regarding Problem 3. As a supplement




Many studies deal with analytical market models involving price competitions among suppliers with
consumers’ switching costs. Ruiz et al. [20] present agametheoretical model to investigatethee ects
of consumers’ switching costson competitionsof suppliers. Ruiz’smodel doesnot represent dynamic
interaction between market participants since the model has two suppliers and assumes two-stage
games. Biglaiser et al. analyzebene tsof suppliers in amodel whereconsumers haveheterogeneous
switching costs [21]. Though Biglaiser’s model related to a model for deregulated markets since
Biglaiser’s model assumes incumbents and entrants, this model also assumes only two-stage games.
Rhodes proposes adynamic model to examine the in uenceof switching costs on price competitions
and discussswitching costscan bebene cial for forward-looking consumers [82]. Consumers in real
electricity retail markets, however, arenot assumed to be forward-looking because they do not tend to
switch their seller while lower charges are available.
Asstudiesconsidering switching costsof consumersfocusing on electricity markets, Giuletti et al.
propose a model to explain the di erence in electricity prices observed in British electricity markets
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[55]. However, [55] considers only searching cost and does not focus on other kinds of switching
costssuch asburden on consumers for switching their supplier. Ruiz et al. present astatic model and
adynamical model to determine theequilibrium of electricity prices to enhance consumers’ behavior
to switch electricity retailer [54]. Though Ruiz’s model considers switching behavior of consumers
by using network structure, themodel does not assume interactions between consumers.
Related studies described above mainly focus on interactions among suppliers such as price
competition. Moreover, the related studies aim at promoting switching behavior of consumers by
changing charges. Nevertheless, if consumersarenot active in termsof switching sellers, suppliersdo
not seem to actively change their charges since theexpected outcomeby updating charges is obscure.
For promoting the switching behavior of consumers, this chapter focuses on interactions between
consumers under thesituation where suppliers do not change their charges.
As studies dealing with the interaction between agents, evolutionary game theory has been used
for promoting cooperative strategies among agents. Notably, network structure where agents placed
is important aspects for investigating the transition of thestrategies. For instance, scale-freenetworks
have degree distribution following a power law, which can be observed in real networks such as
the Internet, the network of acquaintance, and so on [83]. Durán et al. examine the evolution of
cooperation in evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma between agents on random graphs [84]. Lieberman
et al. introduce evolutionary graph theory, which deals with evolutionary dynamics of agents on
random graphs including scale-free networks [85]. Wu et al. explain that cooperation in a public
goods game was promoted by giving rewards or punishments to agents [86]. These studies cannot be
simply applied to express interaction among consumers in electricity marketssincethecharacteristics
of cooperators and defectors arenot de ned for electricity markets.
4.1.2 Contribution
This section lists contributions of proposals regarding each topic presented in Chapter 1 as follows.
First, main contributions regarding Problem 3 are itemized below.
• To express the irrational behavior of consumers, this chapter focuses on two types of switching
costs: (i) e ort at switchingsuppliersand(ii) searchingcosts. Whenaconsumer switchessuppliers,
an e ort is needed to cancel the contract with the previous supplier, create a new contract with a
new supplier, and so on. Moreover, costs to search for information on alternatives such as their
charges arealso required.
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• The preference of consumers over suppliers involving an e ort at switching is modeled as pref-
erence relation with interval order [87]. The preference relation describes a situation where
consumers do not switch suppliers unless the bene t of switching is more signi cant than the
e ort. Electricity charges o ered by suppliers are also modeled based on Japanese electricity
retail markets to determine thepreference relation of consumers.
• To describe interaction among consumers with searching costs, weproposean evolutionary game
on a network among consumers. The game expresses the dynamics of the share of two strategies
of consumers: searching alternatives actively (cooperators) and waiting for suggestions from the
other consumers (defectors).
• For promoting cooperation, thischapter focuseson giving rewards to consumers ascompensation
for searching costs by referring to [86]. Although [86] shows that punishments are moree ective
than rewards to promote cooperation, this thesis does not deal with punishments since it’s highly
unlikely that suppliers punish consumers. Simulation results of the evolutionary game show the
in uence of rewards on cooperation and switching behavior.
4.2 Model representation
4.2.1 Bipartitegraph denotingmarket participants
This section  rstly de nes consumer’s rational preference over suppliers as a simpler model than
irrational preference. The relationship between sellers and buyers in electricity market is modeled by
bipartite graph N (S∪B, E). Seller si ∈S (|S|  2, i = 1, 2, ..., |S|) denotes an electricity supplier,
and buyer bj ∈B ( j = 1, 2, ..., |B|) is a consumer. An edge between si and bj is denoted by e(si, bj ).
bj can purchase electricity from si if e(si, bj ) exists. N is a complete bipartite graph; therefore, bj
is connected to all seller si ∈S. si can be divided into two types: the incumbent and entrants. The
incumbent s1 isasupplier that hasprovided electricity to buyers for a long time. Besides, theentrants
si ∈S (i " 1) are suppliers newly entered into amarket after thederegulation.
Our model represents the situation in which only one supplier s1 provides electricity for all
consumers at the beginning. This is considered to be one of the features of electricity retail markets.
For acomparison, let usconsider cellular phoneservices, which havesimilar characteristicscompared
with electricity retail since theservices havemonthly chargesand several alternatives that consumers
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can choose. The statistics regarding the share of careers in Japan indicate that the maximum share
was about 60% when cellular phones started to be used widely [88]. Thus, users of cellular phone
services had multiple choices from the beginning, and it is di erent from the feature of electricity
retail markets.
Thecombination of electricity trades on N can bedenoted as matching M, which isasubset of E
based on graph theory. bj purchases electricity from only one seller si since bj is assumed to avoid
complicated contractswith multiple si . Conversely, si can supply electricity to multiplebj and satisfy
all demand of bj . Hence, M can be called many-to-one matching that is similar to the model for a
college admission problem [89]. Let δM (bj ) = {si | si ∈S, e(bj, si ) ∈E} be the neighbors of bj on
M. Besides, let δM (si ) = {bj | bj ∈B, e(si, bj ) ∈E} denote neighbors of si on M. Thus, δM(si ) and
δM(bj ) must satisfy 0  |δM(si )|  |B| and |δM(bj )| = 1.
4.2.2 Preferencerelation
Buyer bj must chooseonly onealternativeof seller si ∈Sto purchaseelectricity asadecision problem
of bj . Thissectionde nesrational preferencerelation that issimpler than irrational preferencerelation
presented in Section 4.3. Let Xj ⊆S be a set of alternatives for bj . Xj contains si if e(si, bj ) exists;
hence, Xj is denoted by Xj = {si | e(si, bj ) ∈E} . Adversely, Xj does not contain si if e(si, bj ) ! E.
M is determined after all bj ∈B obtain the solution for their decision problem. Let aj ∈Xj be an
alternative si chosen by bj . M is represented by M = {e(aj, bj ) | aj ∈Xj, bj ∈B} . Thepreference of
bj over every pair of alternatives sk, sl ∈Xj isexpressed aspreferencerelation explained in Chapter 2.
Thischapter dealswith two typesof preferencerelation: strongpreferencerelationand indi erence
relation. Strong preference relation P contains (sk, sl ) if bj prefers sk to sl . In other words, sk is
recognized as apreferred seller compared with sl for bj . skPsl denotes P contains (sk, sl ). P satis es
irre exivity and asymmetry. Indi erence relation I contains (sk, sl ) if bj is indi erent to sk and sl .
skI sl means I ∈(sk, sl ). If skI sl , both skPsl and sl Psk do not hold. I is an equivalence relation and
satis es re exivity and symmetry.
4.2.3 Utility function
Utility is a metric to represent the bene t of bj for choosing an alternative. Utility of bj to choose
alternative si is calculated by a utility function µj : Xj → R. Utility function and preference relation
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µj (si )
s2Ps1 s3Ps2
Fig. 4.1: Exampleof µj (si ) for alternative s1, s2, and s3.
P ∪I meets completeness and transitivity. Furthermore, if P ∪I satis es transitivity, each of P and
I is also transitive. When preference relation is rational, preference relation can be de ned by using
utility function µj as follows.
skPsl  ⇒ µj (sk) > µj (sl ). (4.1)
Fig. 4.1 depicts an example of the relationship between a utility function and preference relation.
µj (si ) gives di erent values over si , and P is set based on µj (si ).
As described in Chapter 2, this thesis only considers electricity charge as the factor of utility
function. Let ci ∈R be the charge o ered by seller si . Moreover, let vj ∈R be valuation for
purchasing electricity by bj . vj is considered to be the budget of bj for purchasing electricity.
µj (si )(si ∈Xj ) isde ned as µj (si ) = vj  ci . Weassumed bj switchesitspresent seller sl to alternative
si if si Psl . If si I sl , bj does not change its seller from sl to si .
4.2.4 Electricity charge
Electricity charge is one of the factors to determine preference relation over si by bj . Though many
types of service plans exist in Japan, this chapter considers the charges based on Meter-rate lighting
B, which is a common service plan o ered by a retailer that formerly supplied electricity as a PU in
Japan. Let H denote the set of months; for instance, we focus on the months from September 2017
to August 2018 as H = {Sep.2017, Oct.2017, ..., Aug.2018}. Let cmi : H → R be the monthly charge
o ered by si at month h ∈H. cmi (h) ismainly composed of two factors: basic charge βand electricity
amount chargeα. Hence, cmi (h) = β+ α. β∈R isa xed chargedeterminedby theamperescontracted
by buyers. Besides, α∈R varies based on electricity demand of each buyer. Let dj : H → R denote
the demand of bj at h. αhave three tiered rate α1, α2, and α3 ∈R that are applied according to dj (h)
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Table4.1: βand αo ered by sellers.
si β α1 α2 α3
s1 842.4 19.52 26 30.02
s2 972 18.24 24.87 28.75
s3 842.4 23.24 23.45 25.93
s4 842.4 21.43 22.63 25.24
s5 842.4 20.76 22.62 25.31
s6 842.4 19.52 24.95 25.92
s7 842.4 19.52 24.09 25.75
s8 842.4 19.4 25.8 25.9
s9 842.4 19.43 24.81 25.99
s10 842.4 19.33 25.74 29.72
s11 800.28 18.54 24.7 28.51
s12 800.28 18.46 24.62 28.44
s13 780 18.07 24.07 27.79
s14 754.37 19.31 24.33 27.21
s15 421.2 24.03 24.03 24.03
























































Figure 1: Average monthly demand of consumers.
Fig. 4.2: Monthly electricity demand of consumers.
as follows.
α=
        
       
 
α1dj (h) (dj (h)  120),
120α1 + α2dj (h) (120 < dj (h)  300),
120α1 + 180α2 + α3dj (h) (300 < dj (h)).
To consider a model of the charges, we picked up Japanese electricity retailers o ering service
plans that are similar to Meter-rate lighting B. Table 4.1 shows the examples of βand α. Contracted
amperesareset to 30A todetermine βsince30A isthemost common contracted amperesinJapan. As
shown in Table4.1, each seller o ersdi erent patternsof βand α. Sincedemand in thefuturecannot
be determined in advance, bj calculates cmi (h) by using dj (h) in the past. Fig. 4.2 shows the average
electricity demand of buyers in Japan from a report [90]. Fig. 4.2 indicates dj (h) varies month to





























































Figure 2: Monthly charge of sellers (based on
monthly demand).
Fig. 4.3: Monthly ranking of sellers based on monthly demand.
4.2.5 Buyer’spreferenceover sellers
Preference relation over si is determined by the magnitude of ci as indicated by (4.1). To express
typical examples of preference relation, Fig. 4.3 shows the ranking of monthly charge cmi (h) (h ∈H)
calculated by using dj (h) shown in Fig. 4.2. Thehighest rank isgiven to si o ering thehighest charge.
The ranking widely di  ers since dj (h) also di ers month to month. Hence, preference relation is
di cult to decide based on the ranking of cmi (h).
To determine preference relation, we focused on the pattern of transitions of electricity de-
mand. Fig. 4.2 shows that the demand changing on an annual basis. The di erence over months
is assumed to decrease by considering the total charge through a year. Let cai : H → R be
the annual total charge at month k ∈ H. Furthermore, let Ha(k) represent twelve months by
k. For instance, when k = Aug. 2018, Ha(Aug. 2018) is de ned as Ha(Aug. 2018) = { h |





Fig. 4.4 shows the ranking of sellers based on the total of charges through a year. The horizontal
axisshowsmonth h, and thevertical axisindicatestherankingof sellersbasedon cai (k). Thedi erence
in ranking becomesnot so largecompared to Fig. 4.3. Let ci denoteachargeo ered by si . Weassume
bj uses the average of cai (Sep.2017), c
a
i (Oct.2017), ..., and c
a
i (Aug.2018) as ci to consider preference





























































Figure 1: Monthly charge of sellers (based on annual
demand).
Fig. 4.4: Monthly ranking of sellers based on annual demand.
The feature of electricity charges described above is not common compared with other homoge-
neousproducts such as gasoline, which isalso an energy product [91]. Although charges for gasoline
are calculated based on demand, thecalculation isnot based on tiered rates in general.
4.3 Switchingcostsof buyers
4.3.1 Preferenceand utility consideringswitchingcosts
This section proposes a model to express irrational preference relation of consumers considering
switching costs. Considering the buyer’s e ort at switching, bj might not change its current seller sl
even if bj hasanother alternative that o ersa lower charge than sl . In thissituation, for an alternative
sk ∈Xj , skI sl holds even if ck < cl and µj (sk) > µj (sl ). Nevertheless, skPsl holds if the utility
obtained by switching is assumed to be larger than the e ort. Regarding preference relation denoted
by (4.1), skI sl holds only if ck = cl and µj (sk) = µj (sl ). Thus, (4.1) cannot represent preference
relation considering thee ort at switching.
To investigate the preference of buyers under switching costs, e ort at switching should be ex-
amined into preference relation described by (4.1). This modi cation enables preference relation to
describe the situation in which transitivity of an indi  erence relation does not hold. For instance, for
sk, sl, sm ∈Xj , let bj currently purchaseelectricity from sk, and each seller o ersdi erent charges. If
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Fig. 4.5: Preference relation with µj (si ) and ε.
One of the methods to represent an indi erence relation with intransitivity is an interval order
[87]. An interval order is an irre exive binary relation and satis es the following condition for
sk, sl, sm, sn ∈Xj .
skPsl and smPsn ⇒ skPsn or smPsl . (4.2)
In an interval order, a threshold to switch from si by bj is integrated into the relationship between
a preference relation and utility function. Let function  j : Xj ⇒ R denote the threshold.  j (si )
indicates switching costs regarding e ort at switching from si . In this chapter,  j (si ) is assumed to
satisfy  j (si ) = ε(ε 0, ε∈R) for all bj ∈B and si ∈Xj . Thus, we use εinstead of  j (si ) in the
following discussion. Therelationship between apreferencerelation and utility function in an interval
order is denoted as
skPsl  ⇒ µj (sk)  µj (sl ) > ε. (4.3)
Let bj currently purchaseelectricity from sl . Basedon(4.3), bj switchesitsseller to sk if thedi erence
of utility between sk and sl is larger than ε. Adversely, bj doesnot switch itsseller if skI sl is satis ed
since µj (sk)  µj (sl )  ε. Fig. 4.5 shows the relationship between a preference relation and utility
function in an interval order. In Fig. 4.5, preference relation has intransitivity of an indi erence
relation sinces2I s1, s3I s2, and s3Ps1 aresatis ed. Thus, preferencerelation based on utility functions
with thee ort at switching can bede ned by an interval order.
4.3.2 Cooperatorsand defectorsamongbuyers
bj isassumed to switch itsseller if (4.3) issatis ed asdescribed in Section 4.3.1. However, bj cannot
switch itsseller toany alternativeif bj isnot abletodiscover an alternativesatisfying (4.3). Especially,
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Fig. 4.6: Exampleof graph G (|B| = 15, m = 1).
bj needs searching cost, which are costs to search for information on alternatives and charges. bj
might not search any sellers if searching costs are considered to be higher for bj , and bj cannot  nd
si satisfying (4.3) contained in Xj . In this situation, bj possibly expects the other buyers who had
already switched their seller to share the information about sellers. We de ne two strategies among
buyers as follows.
C: Exploring alternatives with searching cost
Strategy C (Cooperator) demonstrates cooperative activities. In addition to search for information
about alternatives, bj will suggest the alternative chosen by bj to the other buyers. bj with this
strategy will search for alternatives and decide whether bj should switch its seller or not based
on condition (4.3). This chapter analyzes the e ect of rewards given by entrants to buyers for
enhancing cooperation even though the rewards are costs for entrants. Hence, cooperators who
induced switching behavior of buyers can gain rewards.
D: Avoiding searching cost without exploration
This strategy is called D (Defector) since bj might obtain bene cial information on alternatives as
a free-rider. Though bj with strategy D does not search for alternatives in person, bj can obtain
knowledge from other buyer bk with strategy C. If an alternative suggested by bk meets (4.3), bj
will switch its seller without searching cost.
The interactions are conducted on graph G = (B, E′) where each edge in E′represents a pair of
neighbors of buyers that can share information each other. Thus, after sharing information on graph
G, bj  nally determines its seller on graph N. Since each buyer is assumed to interact with a limited
number of buyers, Barabasi-Albert (BA) model isused for G becauseBA model isutilized to represent
social networks in many studies [92]. In an algorithm to create G based on BA model, every newly
added vertex will be connected to theother m vertices already existed in G. BA model is a scale-free
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(a) Ascending pattern. (b) Descending pattern.
Fig. 4.7: Exampleof the initial assignment of strategy.
network in which each vertex has a di erent degree. Fig. 4.6 shows an example of G with |B| = 15
and m = 1. Dotted lines in Fig. 4.6 denote edges in E′.
4.4 Evolutionary game amongbuyers
4.4.1 Preliminaries
Thissection explainsan evolutionary gameusing graph N and G to investigatetransitionsof strategies
of buyers occurring from time to time. Algorithm 2 shows the overall process of the game based on
an agent-based approach. Due to searching costs, bj chooses one of the two strategies C and D. Let
σtj ∈{C, D} be thestrategy chosen by bj at iteration t in a game. Based on σ
t
j , B can be divided into
two subsets: BtC = {bj | bj ∈B, σ
t
j = C} and B
t
D = {bj | bj ∈B, σ
t
j = D} . Σ





set of strategies of bj ∈B at t.
The initial condition of Σt is denoted by Σ0. Σ0 is determined by the initial assignment of the
strategy of buyers. Let the share of bj ∈BtC over B at iteration t be denoted by θt = |B
t
C|/ |B|. θ0
denotes the initial share of strategy C. θ0 is initialized according to either of two patterns: ascending
pattern and descending pattern. In ascending pattern, buyersaresorted by their degreewith ascending
order. Adversely, buyers are sorted by their degree in descending order with descending pattern. C
will be set to the  rst θ0% of buyers based on sorted order in each pattern. Fig. 4.7a and Fig. 4.7b




4.4.2 Processof a game
At each iteration t, bj will decide one of the alternatives atj ∈Xj . A




|B|} is a set of
alternatives chosen by bj at t. A0 is the initial condition of and At. Let T ∈N be the  nal iteration in
agame. AT is theset of sellers  nally chosen by buyers, and M is determined by AT.
bj ∈BtC searches for the other alternatives by Algorithm 3. sl is an alternative chosen by bj . Let
X′j ⊂Xj denote a set of alternatives already searched by bj . At iteration t = 0, X
′
j = {sl } . Since
bj is assumed not to have information about seller si ! X′j in advance, a new alternative sk ! Xj is
randomly chosen and added to X′j at line 3 and 8 of Algorithm 3. Then, bj will compare µj (sk) with
µj (sl ). To search for alternatives, bj needs a searching cost γtj ∈R. All bj have the same constant
γ(γ 0, γ∈R) as γtj . According to [93], searching activity for prices is assumed to continue if
the bene t from searching is larger than searching cost. Hence, bj is assumed to search for another
alternative if condition (4.3) holds between sk and sl . Otherwise, bj chooses an alternative that has
themaximum utility in X′j .
Besides, based on Algorithm 4, the interaction between each pair of buyers on e(bj, bk) ∈
E′(bj, bk ∈BtC ∪B
t
D) will be conducted to share the information of alternatives with other neigh-
bors. The neighbors of bj on G is denoted by δG(bj ) = {bk | bk ∈B, e(bj, bk) ∈E′} . Algorithm





k ∈Xj, µj (a
t
k)  µj (a
t
j ) > ε} . bj determines whether bj switches its seller from a
t
j to
one of the sellers in Ψtj or not. If bj switching its seller according to the suggestion given by another
buyer bk ∈BtC, reward r (r  0, r ∈R) will begiven to bk who suggested theseller. Let Sr ⊆S\ {s1}
be the set of sellers who gives rewards. Let λ(0  λ 1) be the rate of si ∈Sr over S. Hence,
|Sr | = λ|S \ {s1} |. si ∈Sr is randomly selected at t = 0 in a game. r tj indicates rewards obtained by
bj at iteration t. As a constraint, bk can get at most r as a reward at each iteration. Therefore, r tj will
become 0 or r .
At the end of t, bj will update σtj based on payo , which represents the bene t obtained by bj
considering µj (atj ), γ
t
j , and r
t
j . bj determinesσ
t
j by comparingownpayo withpayo of itsneighbors.
ρ: B → R is a function denoting payo of bj . Let bm be the buyer who has the maximum payo 
among δG(bj )∪bj . Besides, let ρmax denote ρ(bm). Thus, bj choosesitsstrategy σtj considering ρmax.
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Algorithm 2 Process of an evolutionary game
Input: N, G, ε, γ, r, Σ0, A0,T, Xj = S, X′j = {s1} (bj ∈B)
Output: ΣT, AT
1: t = 1
2: while t  T do
3: for each bj ∈B do
4: σtj  σ
t 1
j
5: r tj  0
6: Ψtj   
7: vj  ci of at 1j
8: if σtj = C then
9: Determinesalternative atj by Algorithm 3 using Xj and X
′
j .
10: γtj  γ
11: else
12: atj  a
t 1
j
13: γtj  0
14: end if
15: end for
16: Determines Ψtj for all bj by Algorithm 4 for all e(bi, bj ) ∈E
′.
17: for each bj ∈B do
18: if Ψtj "  then
19: atj  a
t





20: if r tk = 0 then




25: for each bj ∈B do






28: for each bj ∈B do
29: if ρmax < 0 then
30: if ρ(bj ) < 0 then
31: σtj  D
32: end if






35: if ρmax > ρ(bj ) then
36: if σt 1m " σ
t 1
j then







42: t  t + 1
43: end while
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Algorithm 3 Process for searching for alternatives by bj
Input: Xj, X′j
Output: atj = si (si ∈Xj ), X
′
j
1: sl  st 1j
2: if X′j " Xj then
3: sk  sk ∈Xj (sk ! X′j )
4: if µj (sk)  µj (sl ) > εthen
5: sl  sk
6: X′j  X
′
j + {sk}
7: while X′j " Xj do
8: sk  sk ∈Xj (sk ! X′j )
9: if µj (sk)  µj (sl ) > εthen
10: sl  sk




13: if µj (sk) > µj (sl ) then









23: atj  sl
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Algorithm 4 Interaction between buyers
Input: e(bi, bj ), Ψti , Ψ
t
j
Output: Ψti , Ψ
t
j
1: if σt 1i = C then
2: if σt 1j = C then
3: if µj (ati )  µj (a
t
j ) > εthen
4: Add ati to Ψ
t
j
5: else if µi (atj )  µi (a
t
i ) > εthen




8: else if σt 1j = D then
9: if µj (ati )  µj (a
t
j ) > εthen





13: else if σt 1i = D then
14: if σt 1j = C then
15: if µi (atj )  µi (a
t
i ) > εthen













vj at t = 0 c1
ε 1000, 2000, 3000, 4000, 5000, or 6000
γ ε, 1.5ε, or 2ε
r γ
T 50
Table 4.3: Total monthly chargeof each seller si in simulation.
si ci [JPY] Rank si ci [JPY] Rank
s1 90,576 16 s14 87,262 8
s8 90,555 15 s13 86,352 7
s16 89,779 14 s11 86,292 6
s10 89,176 13 s3 86,040 5
s6 88,947 12 s4 85,768 4
s2 88,020 11 s5 85,668 3
s9 87,850 10 s12 85,384 2
s7 87,487 9 s15 83,852 1
4.5 Experimental results
4.5.1 Conditions
Thissection explainscomputational resultsabout simulation experiment of theproposed evolutionary
game. Table 4.2 shows values chosen for parameters in the simulation. Furthermore, Table 4.3
indicates the monthly charge ci o ered by sellers at every iteration in a game. As described in 4.2.5,
ci is the average of cai (Sep.2017), c
a
i (Oct.2017), ..., and c
a
i (Aug.2018). We conducted 10,000 sets of
theexperiment for each set of parameters since theprocess of thegamecontains random factors such
as thestructureof G, theassignment of strategy to buyers, and so on. In thesimulation, thefollowing
two metrics were investigated.
(I) Themaximum share of buyers with strategy C:
This metric indicates how the share of cooperators changed from the initial share θ0 through a
game. Let Θbetheset of θt for all iteration t beforeσtj  nally becomes D for all bj ∈B. Hence, Θ
is represented as Θ= {θt | t = 0, 1, 2, ...,T} . θmax denotes the metric that indicates themaximum
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share of bj ∈BtC in B in a game. θmax is de ned as θmax = max Θ. If cooperation was not
enhanced through overall iterations, θmax = θ0.
(II) Switching rate:
Switching rate φindicates the share of buyers who switched their sellers from the incumbent to
entrants in M obtained at iteration T. φwill also converge as well as θmax since no switching
behavior will beobserved after iteration T.
To analyze thee ect of rewards for buyers,  xed values are chosen as several parameters to focus
on the di erent pattern of the other parameters. The simulation was conducted based on each of the
following two types of conditions.
(A) |Sr | = 0:
This condition examines the cooperation and switching rate of buyers in the case that no sellers
give reward to buyers since |Sr | = 0. The e ort to switch εand searching cost γare assumed to
a ect thesemetrics. Sinceno sellers give reward to buyers, |Sr | = 0 and λ= 0. θ0 ischosen from
0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, or 0.5.
(B) |Sr |  0:
Thiscondition investigates thesituation in which sellersgive reward to buyers for cooperation. In
this condition, θ0 = 0.1 to simplify the results for focusing on the rewards. |Sr | is set by using
λ= 0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, or 1.
4.5.2 Resultsand discussion
(A) Examiningbehavior if |Sr | = 0
(I) Maximum share of C (θmax):
Fig. 4.8a to Fig. 4.8f show θmax without rewards for buyers. Each  gure shows di erent conditions
based on εand ascending/descending pattern. For descending pattern shown in Fig. 4.8ato Fig. 4.8c,
θmax decreased as γincreased in almost every condition. If γ= ε, cooperation was well promoted
compared with the situation in which γ> ε. The reason might be that bj ∈BtC can obtain ρ(bj )  0
if γ ε. Interestingly, Fig. 4.8a indicates cooperation under ε> 5, 000 is promoted as much as
ε= 1, 000. Adversely, bj ∈BtC cannot obtain positive payo ρ(bj ) though they conduct switching if
γ> ε. Therefore, γis considered to bean important factor to promotecooperation.
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For ascending pattern indicated in Fig. 4.8d to Fig. 4.8f, θmax did not change even though εand
γwere di erent. Actually, θmax is the same value as θ0. These results indicate that the number of
neighbors of each buyer has a crucial role in promoting cooperation and switching behavior among
buyers. Conversely, if each buyer does not have many neighbors, large θmax is important because
cooperation among buyers isnot expected to be enhanced.
In all sets of simulation with thecondition |Sr | = 0, σtj  nally became D for all buyers bj ∈B. In
other words, no buyers chosestrategy C at iteration T.
(II) Switching rate (φ):
The switching rate φis shown in Fig. 4.9a to Fig. 4.9f. All  gures indicate that the switching rate
became smaller as εincreased. Especially, when γ> ε, φbecame highly smaller with ε 5, 000.
Considering cooperation, Fig. 4.8b and Fig. 4.8c shows the cooperation is not actively promoted if
ε 5, 000. These results mean bj experienced di culty to discover any preferred seller si without
cooperation if ε 5, 000. Thus, φisalso promoted by cooperation under descending pattern.
For ascending pattern depicted in Fig. 4.9d to Fig. 4.9f, φwas not larger than descending pattern
and demonstrated almost the same value in every  gure regardless of γ. On the other hand, the
di erence between φunder ascending pattern and descending pattern became smaller if ε 5, 000.













































































































(f ) γ= 2ε, ascending pattern.

































































































(f ) γ= 2ε, ascending pattern.
Fig. 4.9: Switching rateof buyers.
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(B) Examiningbehavior if |Sr |  0
(I) Maximum shareof C (θmax):
Fig. 4.10a to Fig. 4.10f show θmax if |Sr |  0. For descending patternsdepicted in Fig. 4.10a to Fig.
4.10c, θmax basically increased as |Sr | expanded except thefollowing two situations. First, thee ect of
|Sr | was not signi cant for buyers with ε= 1, 000 since they actively switched sellers by their search,
and rewards are not necessary for these buyers. Those buyers did not need the suggestion from other
buyers, and the rewards did not a ect θmax. Besides, the e ect of giving rewards was not apparent if
ε 5, 000 especially with γ> ε. The reason is that buyers can rarely discover preferred sellers if
ε 5, 000. Except for the two situations, θmax was improved by giving rewards to buyers.
For ascending patterns depicted in Fig. 4.10d to Fig. 4.10f, θmax keeps almost the same value as
θ0. Thisresult indicatesthat strategy C might not bepropagated if buyersdo not havemany neighbors
even if sellers give rewards.
σtj also  nally became D for all buyers bj ∈B in all sets of simulation with |Sr |  0. σ
t
j might
eventually converge to D, and this perspectiveshould beexamined in the future.
(II) Switching rate (φ):
In the results about descending pattern in Fig. 4.11a to Fig. 4.11c, φbasically increased according
to |Sr | as same as θmax. If γ> ε, however, switching behavior was not much enhanced whereas |Sr |
increased. This result means that φmight not be improved with higher εeven if rewards o set γ.
Since the rewards give little e ects to φwith relatively large ε, it is more important to relieve εof
buyers.
In Fig. 4.11d to Fig. 4.11f, thee ect of rewardswith ascending pattern cannot beobserved. Since
ascending pattern initially allocated strategy C to bj with a relatively smaller degree, the e ect of
promoting switching behavior was also small. Though the rewards for bj ∈BtC is considered to be a
factor to increase φ, it ismore important which buyers initially choosestrategy C in anetwork among




















































































































(f ) γ= 2ε, ascending pattern.




































































Figure 2: a r-switching-rate-sc2-asc1-ini
















Figure 4: a r-switching-rate-sc3-asc1-ini
















Figure 6: a r-switching-rate-sc4-asc1-ini
(f ) γ= 2ε, ascending pattern.
Fig. 4.11: Switching rateof buyers with sellers giving reward (θ0 = 0.1).
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4.6 Summary of thischapter
Thischapter proposedanevolutionary gameonagraphtoanalyzetheswitchingbehavior of consumers.
Preference relation of consumers involving switching costs was de ned and expressed situations
where consumers do not tend to switch their suppliers though lower charges are available. We
examined the conditions to promote cooperation to search for alternatives and switching suppliers in
the computational experiment of the evolutionary game. The results demonstrated that the share of
cooperatorsand theswitching ratewerenot improved by simply giving rewardsfor cooperators. These
resultssuggest that thedegreeof cooperators in anetwork among consumersdemonstratesavital role





This chapter presents amathematical modeling technique for Problem 4.
5.1 Introduction
5.1.1 Literaturereview
Interaction between agents can be modeled as matching in graph theory. The concept of matching is
 rstly introduced by Gale and Shapley in [46]. In a college admission problem presented in [46], a
matching model can be represented by a bipartite graph consists of two types of nodes: colleges and
students. As one of the applications of matching, Easley and Kleinberg proposed matching market,
which determines matching between sellers and buyers as partners to trade a single indivisible item
[44]. A study in [17] proposes a matching problem to describe electricity retail markets to represent
trading for electricity as multi-unit items. Above studies on matching, however, only deal with static
aspects of markets and cannot describe interactions of trading varying with time.
A resource sharing model based on a multi-agent system is called El Farol Bar Problem (EFBP)
[94]. In the EFBP, thecapacity in a bar is considered as a resource shared among agents. Each agent
decideswhether theagent go to abar or not every week. To avoid congestion and enjoy thebar, agents
must achievecooperativebehavior without pursuing their sel sh goal. A potluck problem isproposed
as the generalized version of the EFBP [95]. In the potluck problem, each agent has time-varying
supply and demand for dinner in every week. The goal of the potluck problem is to minimize the
di erence between the total demand and total supply among all agents. The potluck problem only
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focuses on minimizing the di erence in total supply and demand as overall e ciency and does not
consider envy of each agent.
As a metric for envy of each agent, envy-freeness is considered in many resource allocation
problems. If the allocation is envy-free, every agent is satis ed with its allocation and does not
envy the allocation for other agents [96]. Problems about envy-freeness is classi ed into two types:
problems for indivisible goods and problems for divisible goods. As an example of studies for
indivisible goods, Netzer et al. propose a distributed algorithm for minimizing envy among agents
[97]. Asadynamic version of envy-freeallocation problems, onlinecake-cuttingproblem isdiscussed
in [98]. Though dynamic aspectsof resourceallocation problemsareconsidered in [98], theproblems
deal with only  xed amounts of resources over time. This chapter focuses on divisiblegoods such as
electricity.
Resourcesharing among prosumersmight beconducted with limited neighborsthat areconnected
to each other. Hence, resources and envy can be partially observable from a prosumer’s viewpoint.
The partial observation is considered in a resource allocation problem proposed in [99]. Even
though thisproblem dealswith dynamic settings, it considers indivisibleresourceallocation. Besides,
resourcesshared among agentsarenot changed dynamically in [99] though each agent cannot observe
all resources. Beynier also introduces methods for envy-free allocation in social networks, which
can describe a more realistic situation about partial observation of agents [100]. However, methods
proposed in [100] are tailored for theallocation for indivisible resources.
To represent conditions of prosumers varying with time, our model for resource sharing among
prosumers [101] utilizes Time-Varying Graph (TVG) [32]. TVG is also called temporal network.
On the temporal networks, community structures change with time [31]. For example, [31] explains
several events about communities such as growth, contraction, merge, split, and so on. Hence, it
is required to consider the time-varying structural change about networks of prosumers for resource
sharing.
Rossetti et al. proposed stream graphs, which is an extension of several concepts of graph theory
to analyze the temporal characteristics of networks. Especially, [102] de nes bipartite stream, which
is an extension of bipartite graphs to temporal networks. Although the bipartite stream can model
the appearance/disappearance of nodes and edges on a bipartite graph, every node belongs to the
samegroup in thebipartitegraphs through a timespan. Hence, thebipartitestreamscannot represent
periodical changes in the roleof nodes in bipartitenetworks.
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5.1.2 Contribution
Thischapter proposesamodel for analyzing envy in resourcesharing among prosumers in atemporal
network. Main contributionsof this chapter are itemized below.
• This chapter introduces a resource sharing model among prosumers in a social network. The
model deals with time-varying supply and demand of prosumers based on the model proposed in
our previousstudy [101]. Asan extensionof themodel in [101], therelationshipamongprosumers
for resource sharing is represented as social network. Thus, prosumers share their resources only
with their neighbors in a model of social network. As models of social network, this chapter
utilizes Barabasi-Albert (BA) model [92] and Watts-Strogatz (WS) model [103].
• The extended concepts of envy are introduced since resource sharing is conducted on a social
network in the proposed model. The envy in resource sharing discussed in related works is
de ned in the situation where all agents share the same resources each other over time. In our
assumption of resourcesharing in asocial network, however, theamount of resources to beshared
is di erent in each prosumer and varies with time. Therefore, this chapter de nes indices to
evaluateenvy-freeness among prosumers that focuseson aresourceallocation problem in asocial
network.
• Weformulateaminimumcost circulation problem to discover matching that maximizesutilization
of resources of prosumers and satis es the constraints of supply and demand of prosumers.
Furthermore, to reduce envy among prosumers in the circulation problem, this chapter discusses
the adjustment of weight assigned to arcs (directed edges) in a  ow network for the circulation
problem. Experimental results indicate that appropriate weight settings on arcs can decrease the
envy among prosumers over timewhilemaximizing theutilization of resources of prosumers.
Thischapter isstructured as follows. Section 5.2 explains fundamental de nitionsof our resource
sharing model used in thefollowing sections. Theconcept of envy of prosumers in asocial network is
also introduced in Section 5.2. Section 5.3 formulatesaminimum cost circulation problem to discover
matching in theresourcesharing model. Section 5.4 demonstratesexperimental resultsabout theenvy
among prosumers in thematching. Section 6.1 concludes thischapter and explains futureworks.
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(b) Exampleof G at t.
Fig. 5.1: Exampleof graph N and G.
5.2 De nitionson temporal network
5.2.1 Model representation
Agents share their resources on a social network represented by undirected graph N (V ∪{v0}, E). V
is aset of node vi ∈V (i = 1, 2, ..., |V |), and each node vi denotes an agent of aprosumer. v0 is anode
to cover imbalance of resource sharing among agent vi ∈V. v0 does not denote a prosumer. E is a
set of undirected edge (vi, vj ) (vi, vj ∈V). Since N is undirected graph, both (vi, vj ) and (vj, vi ) are the
sameedge. Edge (vi, vj ) represents the relationship where vi isaneighbor of vj . Agentsarewilling to
share resources only with their neighbors. Adversely, vi and vj do not share their resources if (vi, vj )
does not exist. E also contain edges (v0, vi ) for any vi ∈V. Thus, arbitrary vi share resources with v0.
Fig. 5.1ashows an exampleof N.
In resource sharing, the amounts of available resources for each agent will vary with time. To
represent thevariation of resources, weutilizea temporal network constructed based on N. Temporal
network G (V ∪{ v0}, Et, T ) isan undirected graph that hasaset of agentsV, which is thesameasthe
agents in N. T is a timespan for G, and t ∈T (t = 1, 2, 3...,T) isa round to describeeach stateof G.
Et is a set of edges at t in G. Et does not contain (vi, vj ) if (vi, vj ) ! E. The set of agentsV does not
change through T .
5.2.2 Rolesof agentsbased on their production and demand
Every agent vi ∈V has itsown demand and production of resources at t. Thedemand of resources of
vi is δti , and the production of resources of vi is ρ
t
i . At each round t, vi uses ρ
t
i to cover its δ
t
i . Based
on thecondition about δti and ρ
t
i , vi will beassigned to oneof the following three roles.
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1. ρti > δ
t
i




i . vi will share
thesurplus as seller to theother agents. Theset of sellers isVtS ⊆V.
2. δti > ρ
t
i




i since its de cit is more than its surplus. vi
will try to cover its de cit as buyer by getting surplus from other agents. The set of buyers is
VtB ⊆V.
3. δti = ρ
t
i
vi can cover its own demand δti by using its own production ρ
t
i at t. Regarding resource sharing,
vi hasno surplusand de cit for sharing at t. Hence, vi doesnot join theresourcesharing at t, and
roleof vi is called none at t.
Fig. 5.1b shows an example of production and demand of agents vi ∈V of G at t. Regarding v1,
production ρt1 = 60, and demand δ
t
1 = 20. Thus, v1 is a seller at t with its surplus p
t
1 = 40. About v4,
production ρt4 = 20, and demand δ
t
4 = 50. Hence, v4 becomes abuyer at t with its de cit d
t
4 = 30.
As aconstraint for resource sharing in our model, all surplus pti and de cit d
t
i must beshared at t.
However, theimbalanceof surplusand de cit of resourceswill occur sinceevery agent vi individually
determinesdemand δti and production ρ
t
i without considering thebalanceamong other agents. Hence,
surplus pti and de cit d
t
i arenot necessarily o set by resource sharing only among agents.
To o set the imbalance of the surplus and de cit, v0 has both surplus and de cit to o set the all




total surplusof all vi ∈VtS. Thus, d
t
0 isde ned as d
t
0 = P









the total of de cit of all vi ∈VtB. Therefore, p
t
0 is de ned as p
t
0 = D
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Fig. 5.2: Exampleof edges in G at t.
5.2.3 Neighborsof each agent accordingto agent’srole
Agent vi ∈V shares its resources with its neighbors. To explain the relationship to describe resource










5.2 shows an exampleof these edgesets. Thede nitionsof theedgesetsare as follows.





VtB). Edges in E
t
d describe theopportunity for resource sharing between vi and vj .
• Ets contains edges between agents which belong to the same set. Hence, (vi, vj ) ∈E
t
s (vi, vj ∈
VtS or vi, vj ∈V
t
B). No resource is shared on edges in E
t
s that are used to describe envy among
agents. Thede nition of envy is explained in Section 5.2.6.






B). Edges in E
t
0 can
beused to cover resources that are not o set by resource sharing only among vi .
The set of neighbors of vi ∈V over an edgeset Et is denoted by the following function.
adj (vi, Et) = {vj ∈V | (vi, vj ) ∈Et } . (5.3)




0 are represented by
adj (vi, Etd), adj (vi, E
t
s), andadj (vi, E
t
0), respectively. For example, regardingv1 inFig. 5.2, adj (v1, E
t
d) =
{v4, v5} and adj (v1, Ets) = {v2} .
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5.2.4 Utility function
Bene t of vi ∈V for resource sharing is represented by utility function µt : V → R. This chapter
focuses on bene t of agents vi ∈V, and bene t of v0 is not considered. In G, v0 might need more
costs to o set the di erence than agents vi since v0 must prepare for pt0 and d
t
0 according to surplus
and de cit of vi every round. Hence, it is assumed that resources of v0 are more expensive than that
of other agents. Becauseof thiscondition, vi prefers resource sharing with vj ∈V to resourcesharing
with v0.
Utility function µt isde ned by bene t from resources and theamountsof resources in sharing at
round t. Let φand φ0 be the bene t for sharing one unit of resource with vj ∈V and v0, respectively.
Sinceresourcesof v0 ismoreexpensivethan vj , φand φ0 areconsidered to satisfy at least φ> φ0. Let
yt bethetotal amountsof resourcesobtained from all neighborsadj (vi, Etd) at round t. For instance, in
Fig. 5.2, yt of v1 represents the amounts of resources shared with v4 and v5. Moreover, yt0 represents
theamountsof resources obtained from v0. Thus, theutility of vi ∈VtS∪V
t
B at round t iscalculated by
µt(vi ) = φꞏ yt + φ0 ꞏ yt0. (5.4)
For simplicity, weassume φ= 1 and φ0 = 0. Therefore, equation (5.4) can bedenoted as
µt(vi ) = yt . (5.5)
Since all surplus must be shared at t, for sellers vi ∈VtS, y
t + yt0 = p
t
i . Likewise, for buyers vi ∈V
t
B,
yt + yt0 = d
t
i because all de cit d
t
i must beshared.
To increase utility of agents, resource sharing among agents vi ∈V should be conducted as much
as possible since φ> φ0. In other words, resources of v0 should be utilized only if the amounts of
resourcesof vi arenot su cient to o set all surplusand de cit. Theconditionsfor resourceallocation
described abovecan bediscovered by maximizing the total of yt over all agents. Methods to discover
the resource allocation for the maximization will be presented in Section 5.3. Available resources of
vi means theamountsof resources of neighbors vj ∈adj (vi, Etd).
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5.2.5 Utility rate
The size of utility is quite di erent in each agent since each agent has adi  erent amount of available
resources (surplus or de cit) of neighbors. Hence, utility µt(vi ) cannot be directly compared with
other agents. To compare the utility over agents, it is required to de ne a criterion to describe a
normalized measure of utility over agents. This chapter de nes utility rate ωti ∈[0, 1] that indicates
how much amount of agent’s resource isshared among agentsvi ∈V. De nitions to determineωti are
presented later in thissection.
The available resources for vi must be de ned to determine ωti . Seller vi ∈V
t
S share its resources
with buyers vj ∈VtB. Buyer vi ∈V
t
B share its resources with sellers vj ∈V
t
S. Thus, the available
resources of vi is de ned using the sum of resources of neighbors vj ∈adj (vi, Etd). For instance, in
Fig. 5.1a, seller v1 recognizes thede cit of neighbors v5 and v4 as resources. For vi ∈VtS, the total of
de cit dtj of neighbors vj ∈adj (vi, E
t
d) is denoted by
Dti =
#
vj ∈adj (vi ,Etd )
dtj . (5.6)
Besides, as available resource for vi ∈VtB, the total surplus p
t






vj ∈adj (vi ,Etd )
ptj . (5.7)




• For seller vi ∈VtS:












i since vi can share resources up to its surplus
pti . This situation means vi can utilize only a part of D
t









vi can only share resources up to Dti . Thus, surplus p
t













i . According to the conditions described above,





• For buyer vi ∈VtB:




i , and conditionsto obtain α
t
i issimilar to theconditionsof sellers
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Fig. 5.3: Exampleof utility rate.






i since vi can only share resources up to P
t




i , de cit d
t
i can be o set
by Pti . Hence, α
t





Therefore, αti is calculated as follows.
αti =
    

















All resources of αti are not necessarily allocated to vi because some resources in α
t
i might also be
shared with the other agents and allocated to them. A part of αti allocated to vi can be denoted by





When αti = 0, vi has no resource to share, and ω
t





be de ned if |adj (vi, Etd)| = 0. If one of the conditions described above holds, ω
t
i is not de ned at t.
Hence, envy of vi explained in Section 5.2.6 is not de ned at t with theaboveconditions, either.
Fig. 5.3showsanexampleof theamountsof availableresourcesαti andutility rateω
t
i . Theamounts
of resources shared on edges are denoted on each edge. Regarding v1, its surplus is represented by











1) = 40. In this example, v1 obtained 20 units of resources from v5. Hence, y
t = 20,
and µt(v1) = 20. Therefore, utility rateωt1 = 20/ 40 = 1/ 2.
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5.2.6 Envy amongagents
At every round t, vi possibly hasenvy to each of itsneighborsabout allocated resources. Envy exists if
vi and itsneighbor vj are in thesameset VtS or V
t
B. If vi, vj ∈V
t
S, both vi and vj arewilling to sharetheir
surplus to vk ∈VtB. Conversely, both of vi, vj ∈V
t
B will desire resources of the same agent vk ∈V
t
S.
Thus, vi has envy over vj if vj ∈adj (vi, Ets).
The de nition of envy in this chapter is similar to [97]. However, this chapter de nes envy by
using utility rateeven though [97] utilizeutility function. Envy of vi to vj about utility rate isde ned
as local envy ξ: V ×V → [0, 1]. ξ(vi, vj ) isde ned as
ξ(vi, vj ) =
    













wherevj ∈adj (vi, Ets). Therangeof ξ(vi, vj ) is[0, 1] becausetheminimumof ω
t
i iszero, andmaximum
valueof ωti isone. Becauseof thisde nition, ξ(vi, vj ) isnot de ned at round t if either of thefollowing
conditions is satis ed at t.
1. |adj (vi, Ets)| = 0. (There is no neighbor to de ne envy.)
2. |adj (vi, Etd)| = 0. (ω
t
i cannot be de ned in thiscase.)
3. αti = 0. (ω
t
i cannot bede ned in thiscase.)
Due to theabovecondition 1 and 2, ξ(vi, vj ) cannot bedetermined throughout T if vi ∈V has zero or
oneneighbor in N. Thus, weassume vi ∈V has two or more neighbors in N.
To compare envy among agents, envy of vi at t must be denoted as one value. However, ξ(vi, vj )
can be de ned for multiple neighbors vj ∈adj (vi, Ets). Hence, for the comparison of envy among
agents, the maximum value of ξ(vi, vj ) is chosen as envy of vi at t. Envy of vi at t is represented by





is themaximum value in Ξi , ηti is represented by
ηti = max Ξi . (5.11)
If |Ξi | = 0 at the round t, ηti is not de ned at t. Te ⊆T is the set of rounds in which η
t
i is de ned.
Sinceηti is not determined in some t as described above, |Te|  |T |.
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! t2 = 1/ 3
! t3 = 1
! t4 = 1
! t5 = 1
 (v1, v2) = 0
 (v2, v3) = 2/ 3  (v3, v2) = 0
 (v5, v4) = 0
 (v4, v5) = 0
 t2 = 2/ 3  
t
3 = 0
 t1 = 0  t4 = 0
 t5 = 0
! t1 = 1/ 2
 (v2, v1) = 1/ 6
Fig. 5.4: Exampleof envy.
Fig. 5.4 showsexamplesof ξ(vi, vj ) and ηti in G at t. Utility rateω
t
i is thesameasFig. 5.3. About
seller v2, ξ(v2, v1) = 1/ 6 and ξ(v2, v3) = 2/ 3. Thus, envy of v2 at t is ηt2 = 2/ 3. Regarding sellers v1
and v3, ηt1 = 0 and η
t




3 are larger than ω
t
2. For buyers v4 and v5, η
t
4 = 0 and





5.2.7 Index todenote envy of each agent
To describeenvy of eachagent through timespan T , thischapter de nestwo kindsof index asfollows.
1. Envy-freeamount index  ai ∈[0, 1]:
 ai indicates the envy of vi in terms of the amounts of resources that vi shared among agents.  
a
i








High  ai means vi shared little amounts of resources among agents. Adversely, vi does not have
much envy if  ai is low. Since  
a
i is de ned by the actual amount of resources which vi obtained,
 ai might not besuitablefor prosumersthat do not consider thedi  erenceof amountsof resources
in detail.
2. Envy-free round index  ri ∈[0, 1]:
Envy-free round index  ri indicates the number of rounds in which vi have envy to other agents.
 ri will be used to examine only whether vi has envy or not at each round. To describe rounds at
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which vi has envy, r ti is de ned as
r ti =
    
   
 
1 (ηti > 0),
0 (ηti = 0).
(5.13)
vi has envy at round t if r ti = 1. Hence,  
r








Considering bounded rationality, prosumers are possibly not sensitive to the di  erence in the
amounts of resources.  ri is assumed to beutilized in theabovesituations.
5.3 Problem formulation
5.3.1 Bipartitegraph and matchingfor resource sharing
Resourceallocation among agentsat round t can berepresented asmatching M. Thissection explains
thede nition of M, and methods to discover M arepresented in Section 5.3.2 and 5.3.3. M isde ned
on G (V ∪{ v0}, Et), which isan undirected graph at t in G. M isdenoted as many-to-many matching
since each node in M has one or more edges. To determine M, G is converted to a directed bipartite
graph G′(St ∪Bt, At), which isadirected graph with two typesof nodesetsdenoted by St and Bt. For
every arc (v, w) ∈At, nodes v and w belong to St and Bt , respectively. Theexistenceof arc (v, w) ∈At
means v and w can share resources on thearc. Fig. 5.5 showsexamples of G and G′.
Nodes in G are mapped into nodes in G′. St contains all vi ∈VtS. Similarly, B
t includes all
vi ∈VtB. SinceG




t , vb0 ∈B




0 covers the gap of all
surplus of vi ∈VtS. Therefore, S
t = VtS ∪{v
s
0} and B
t = VtB ∪{ v
b
0} . Fig. 5.5b depicts a bipartitegraph
G′converted from G shown in Fig. 5.5a. In Fig. 5.5a, VtS = {v1, v2, v3} and V
t
B = {v4, v5} . Hence,
St = {v1, v2, v3, vs0} and B
t = {v4, v5, vb0} in Fig. 5.5b.




d are converted to arcs (vi, vj ) ∈A
t.
For instance, G′in Fig. 5.5b has arcs converted from edges in G shown in Fig. 5.5a. Edges in Et0 are
also converted to arcs in At. vs0 are connected to all vj ∈V
t
B with arc (v
s
0, vj ). Similarly, A
t has (vi, vb0)
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Fig. 5.5: Exampleof G and G′.
(vi ∈VtS). On the other hand, any edges in E
t
s are not converted to arcs in A
t because no resource
sharing isconducted on edges in Ets.
By using resource allocation obtained as M, the value of utility function µt(vi ) can be calculated.
To obtain µt(vi ), variables yt and yt0 areused asexplained in Section 5.2.4. M isdenoted by theset of
arcs and thevalues of  ow on thearcs in G′. The  ow corresponds to yt and yt0 in equation (5.4). As
de ned in Section 5.2.4, yt is the total amounts of resources obtained by vi from all neighbors except
v0. Let adj (vi, At) denote neighbors of vi in G′except vb0 and v
s
0. adj (vi, A
t) is de ned according to
theset to which vi belongs in G′. If vi ∈St , adj (vi, At) = {vj ∈(Bt \ {vb0} ) | (vi, vj ) ∈A
t } . Thus, when
vi ∈St, yt is de ned by using  ow as follows.
yt =
#
vj ∈adj (vi ,At )
x(vi, vj ). (5.15)
If vi ∈Bt , adj (vi, At) = {vj ∈(St \ {vs0} ) | (vj, vi ) ∈A
t} . Hence, when vj ∈Bt , yt isobtained by
yt =
#
vj ∈adj (vi ,At )
x(vj, vi ). (5.16)
Besides, yt0 is the total amountsof resources obtained from v0. By using  ow, y
t
0 isde ned as follows




    
   
 
x(vi, vb0) (vi ∈V
t
S),

























































(b) Resources shared in G.
Fig. 5.6: Relationship between matching M and graph G.
Fig. 5.6a is an example of M determined in G′shown in Fig. 5.5b. The value of  ow is denoted
on each arc in Fig. 5.5b. As shown in Fig. 5.6a, M is represented by the set of arcs and the values
of  ow on the arcs. If the value of  ow on an arc is not zero, M contains the arc. An arc with zero
 ow is not included in M. Fig. 5.6b shows G that corresponds to M in G′. In Fig. 5.6b, the value
of resource shard on each edge is denoted on the edge. Thus, the allocation of resources in G can be
determined by M in G′. The allocation of resources determines variables yt and yt0 to obtain utility
rate and the indices about envy for each agent. For instance, in both Fig. 5.6a and Fig. 5.6b, yt and
yt0 of v1 are determined as y
t = 20 and yt0 = 20 since x(v1, v5) = 20 and x(v1, v
b
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Fig. 5.8: A directed graph H′to solvecirculation.
5.3.2 Circulation todiscover matching
Resources of agents vi should be e ciently shared in matching M. The most e cient resource
allocation in M can be achieved by maximizing  ow among vi in G′. We consider a minimum cost
circulation problem [27] to discover M that maximizes  ow among all agents. Fig. 5.7 shows a
directed graph H to de ne the circulation problem. In this circulation problem, the objective is to
discover the minimum cost feasible circulation, which satis es two constraints (2.1) and (2.2). The
circulation problem is di erent from general network  ow problems since thegraph H does not have
source and sink. Hence, constraint (2.2) must be satis ed in all nodes in the circulation problem. H
can be constructed from G′such as the graph depicted in Fig. 5.5b. G′can be converted to H by
adding node o and t and arcs explained in Table 5.1.
Matching M can beobtained astheminimum cost feasiblecirculation on H satisfying thecapacity
constraints shown in Table 5.1. Weights of arcs c(v, w) shown in Table 5.1 are set to maximize  ow
among vi . About  ow from source o, the weight of arcs for vi is set to c(o, vi ) = 0. The weight of an
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Table5.1: Arc (v, w) added to G′for constructing H.
v w l b(v, w) ub(v, w) c(v, w)






















o vs0 0 D
t
j z > 0





vb0 t 0 P
t
i z > 0
t o max(Pt, Dt) max(Pt, Dt) 0
arc for vs0, on the other hand, is set to c(o, v
s
0) = z (z > 0). According to the minimum cost feasible
circulation, resourcesharing among vi isselected in preference to resourcesharing with vs0. Likewise,
regarding  ow toward sink t, c(vj, t) = 0 and c(vb0, t) = z (z > 0). Therefore,  ow from vj to t is
chosen in preference to  ow from vb0 in theminimum cost feasiblecirculation.
Thecirculation problem on H can besolvedwithgeneral algorithmsfor aminimumcost maximum
 ow problem by changing arcs in H. We utilize H′which can be obtained by removing arc (t, o)
from H and adding arc (t′, o) to H. Fig. 5.8 shows an example of H′converted from H depicted
in Fig. 5.7. Flow bounds of (t′, o) are the same as the bounds of (t, o). Thus, l b(t′, o) = 0
and ub(t′, o) = max(Pt, Dt). Then, the minimum cost feasible circulation on H is obtained as the
minimum cost maximum  ow on t′-t path in H′.
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Table5.2: c(v, w) considering envy weight.
v w c(v, w)
o vi ∈VtS ψ
t
i ∈[0, 1]
o vs0 z > 1
vj ∈VtB t ψ
t
j ∈[0, 1]
vb0 t z > 1
5.3.3 Circulation consideringenvy amongparticipants
Asdescribed above, matching M maximizing resourcesharing among vi at round t can beobtained by
solving the circulation problem. However, that circulation problem does not consider the aspects of
envy-freenessamong prosumers. Furthermore, sincethecirculation problem focuseson the ow only
at round t, thecirculation problem needs amodi cation to realize desirable resource sharing through
timespan in a temporal network.
Envy weight isde ned for thecirculationproblem todiscover M with lower envy amongprosumers
whilemaximizing e ciency in resource allocation. Theenvy weight is theweight of arc that re ects
envy of prosumers to the resource allocation in future rounds. Thus, prosumers who have more envy
than otherswill bepreferentially allocated resources by using envy weight in thecirculation problem.
ψti denotes envy weight for vi at t. As the initial condition at t = 1, ψ
t
i = 0. T
′⊆T isa timespan
before round t (1 < t  T). For instance, for t = 4, T ′= {1, 2, 3} . As well as envy-free amount index
 ai , η
t





′denotes the set of rounds in which ηti is de ned. If |T
′
e | = 0, ψ
t
i = 0
sincethiscondition meansenvy doesnot exist beforeround t. By using thede nitiondescribed above,
ψti is de ned as
ψti = 1  












/ |T ′e |




Therefore, ψti is in the interval [0, 1].
Table 5.2 shows weight of arcs c(v, w) modi ed from the de nition in Table 5.1 to the de nition
considering ψti . Low ψ
t
i makes the cost of  ow of vi high. Thus, in the minimum cost circulation
problem, the priority of vi in resource allocation will decrease compared to vj , which has ψtj higher
than ψti . If ψ
t
i is used to calculate circulation, the value of z must be larger than ψ
t
i so that resource
sharing among prosumers will be preferentially selected rather than vs0 and v
b
0. Hence, z must satisfy




(a) BA model. (b) WSmodel
Fig. 5.9: Examples of social network models.
Table 5.3: Thevalues used as parameters in simulation.
Parameter Value
T 100
|V | 20, 40, 60, 80, or 100
ρti randomly chosen from { ρ
t
i ∈N0 | ρ
t
i ∈[0, 100)}
δti randomly chosen from {δ
t
i ∈N0 | δ
t
i ∈[0, 100)}
m (BA model) 2
k (WS model) 4
p (WSmodel)
0.2 (|V| = 20),
0.3 (|V| = 40),
0.35 (|V | = 60),
0.4 (|V | = 80, 100)
5.4 Experimental results
5.4.1 Conditions
To analyzeenvy among agents in e cient resourceallocation determined by theproposed circulation
problem, simulation experiments were conducted. As common models to construct social networks,
this chapter utilizes BA model and WS model in the simulation. Fig. 5.9a depicts an example of
the BA model. A graph constructed as BA model is called scale-free network in which only a small
part of nodeshas larger degreecompared to theother nodes. Wefocuson thischaracteristicsbecause
achieving lower envy might become di  cult if there is larger deviation about degree of nodes in a
graph. On theother hand, WSmodel doesnot havescale-freeproperty and relatively smaller deviation
of degree of nodes compared to BA model. Fig. 5.9b shows an example of WS model utilized for
comparison.
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Table 5.3 shows parameter conditions used in the simulation. T means the number of rounds in
a time span T as one set of the experiments. |V | was chosen from  ve values to analyze in uences
of the number of agents. Parameter m for BA model and parameter k for WS model were chosen so
that the similar number of edges are generated in both types of graphs. Parameter p for WS model
in uences clustering coe cient of graph, which indicates the existence of clustering in the graph. In
the simulation, p was set to make clustering coe cient of graphs of WS model closer to clustering
coe cient of graphs of BA model.
The simulation has ten patterns of parameter conditions since  vevalues of |V | were used for the
two types of graph structure: BA model and WS model. The simulation experiment is conducted
1,000 sets for each parameter condition since the parameters contains random factors such as graph
structure, production ρti , and demand δ
t
i . Hence, 1,000 instances of G were generated for each
parameter condition. To impartially compare the proposed problem with envy weight and without
envy weight, matching M was determined by using the same instance of G for both conditions every
round. According to thecondition of degreeof agent vi of N in Section 5.2.6, every instanceof graph
N used in thesimulation satis es that every agent vi in the instance has two or moreneighbors.
A simulation software was developed with Python. In the simulation, a python library called
NetworkX [104] was utilized for constructing graphs based on BA model and WS model. Moreover,
theproposed circulation problem issolved by using amethod to solveaminimum cost maximum  ow
algorithm de ned in NetworkX.
Asanevaluationmetric, theaverageof  ai and  
r
i over agentsiscalculated toexaminethemagnitude
of envy-freeness of overall agents. Moreover, the standard deviation of  ai and  
r
i for all agent vi ∈V
is obtained to investigate thesizeof variance in each index of envy-freeness over agents.
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5.4.2 Resultsand discussion
Following results and discussion explain how envy weight in uenced envy among prosumers in
matching, which represents e cient resource utilization determined by the proposed circulation
problem.
Averageof each index over agents
The average of  ai among agents is shown in Fig. 5.10. The charts in this section depict the results
about 1,000 sets of experiments for each parameter condition. Fig. 5.10a shows the average of  ai
regarding BA model. These results indicate that the di erence between the two weight conditions is
not so signi cant. If the number of agents increased, theaverageof  ai of matching with envy weight
is slightly lower than matching without envy weight. Fig. 5.10b shows the average of  ai about WS
model. The average value of  ai regarding WS model is lower compared to that of BA model. Unlike
BA model, theaverageof  ai in WS model slightly decreased as thenumber of agents increased.
The averageof  ri is shown in Fig. 5.11. Fig. 5.11a shows theaverageof  
r
i regarding BA model.
The characteristics of the di erence of  ri between two weight conditions are similar to that of  
a
i .
With almost every condition, the average value of  ri is relatively larger than that of  
a
i . Besides, Fig.
5.11b shows the average of  ri about WS model. Similar to the results about  
a
i , the average of  
r
i in
WS model was lower compared to  ri in BA model. About WS model, the value of  
r
i is also slightly
larger than  ai .
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(a) Averageof  ai (BA model). (b) Averageof  
a
i (WS model).
Fig. 5.10: Averageof envy-free amount index  ai .
(a) Averageof  ri (BA model). (b) Averageof  
r
i (WS model).
Fig. 5.11: Averageof envy-free round index  ri .
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Standard deviation of each index over agents
Thestandard deviationof  ai over agentsisshown inFig. 5.12. Fig. 5.12ashowsthestandard deviation
of  ai in BA model. Thestandard deviationof  
a
i with envy weight wasrelatively lower than  
a
i without
envy weight. Fig. 5.12b shows the standard deviation of  ai in WS model. By comparing Fig. 5.12b
with Fig. 5.12a, thedeviation of  ai in WSmodel isclearly lower than that in BA model. Thestandard
deviation of  ai with envy weight wasalso lower than  
a
i without envy weight in WSmodel. However,
the di erence of the standard deviation of  ai of two conditions in WS model was smaller than that
of BA model. Therefore, although themagnitudeof improvement is di erent according to BA model
and WSmodel, thematching with lower standard deviation of  ai wasdiscovered by using envy weight
for both models.
Fig. 5.13showsthestandarddeviationof  ri amongagents. Fig. 5.13ashowsthestandarddeviation
of  ri in BA model. Asshown in Fig. 5.13a,  
r
i in BA model demonstrated similar characteristicsof  
a
i
shown in Fig. 5.12a. There is no large di  erence between the values of  ai and  
r
i . Fig. 5.13b shows
the standard deviation of  ri in WS model. As well as BA model, the characteristics of the standard
deviation of  ri shown in Fig. 5.13b isalmost similar to that of  
a
i demonstrated in Fig. 5.12b. Hence,
as well as  ai , thematching with lower standard deviation of  
r
i was found by applying envy weight in
thecirculation problem.
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(a) Standard deviation of  ai (BA model). (b) Standard deviation of  
a
i (WS model).
Fig. 5.12: Standard deviation of envy-free amount index  ai .
(a) Standard deviation of  ri (BA model). (b) Standard deviation of  
r
i (WS model).
Fig. 5.13: Standard deviation of envy-free round index  ri .
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5.4.3 Discussions
Regarding weight conditions, envy weight contributed to improve both  ai and  
r
i mainly in terms of
variance of the indices over agents for both BA model and WS model. By integrating envy weight
into theminimum cost circulation problem, envy among agents can bereduced in resource allocation
determined as matching compared to matching obtained without considering envy weight. However,
the magnitude of di  erence in each index between two weight conditions is not so large especially
regarding  ai . Since the proposed circulation problem determines matching maximizing e ciency of
resourceutilization of agents, thecirculation problem with envy weight demonstrates theexistenceof
matching that representsresourceallocation improving fairnesswhilemaximizinge ciency. Because
our proposed approach to  nd matching is heuristics, considering theoretical bounds for the value of
each index is an interesting future topic.
Comparing  ai with  
r
i , the average of each index demonstrates the di  erence in both BA model
and WS model. Results indicate the average of  ri is relatively larger than the average of  
a
i . Thus,
prosumerswill feel larger envy with  ri asametricof equity compared to  
a
i at least by usingconditions
in Table5.3. Simulation experimentswith additional parameter conditions will giveus more insights
about thedi erence in  ai and  
r
i .
The standard deviation of  ai and  
r
i , on the other hand, does not demonstrate a large di erence
between  ai and  
r
i for eachof BA model andWSmodel. Theseresultsindicatethat bothof thematching
determined with two weight conditionshavealmost thesameperformanceabout thevarianceof envy
among agents. Regarding the results of BA model with those of WS model, the results indicate that
the di erence of envy over prosumers in BA model might be larger than that of WS model since the
standard deviation of  ai and  
r
i in BA model is greater than WS model. Therefore, the structure of a
social network might also a ect thesizeof envy for each prosumer.
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5.5 Summary of thischapter
This chapter proposed model deals with resource sharing among agents representing prosumers. To
evaluateenvy-freenessfor resourcesharingamongagentsinasocial network, weproposedtwoindices:
envy-free amount index and envy-free round index. Simulation results demonstrated theenvy among
agentsisreduced by using theproposedminimumcost circulation problem and theconditionof weight
onarcsina ow network for theproblem. Additionally, thesimulationresultsdemonstrated that agents
will face the di erent magnitude of unfairness in each index of envy. Although the concept of envy-
freeness for resourcesharing wasproposed in thischapter, morerealistic datasetsof electricity should





The results of studies on four problems contextualize the objective of this thesis, which is to analyze
consumers’ bene ts in electricity markets to consider successful mechanisms. Regarding Problem
1, concepts of graph theory were utilized to propose market models for electricity markets, which
represent both bene ts of participants and constraints on supply and demand. A market model to
represent deregulated electricity markets was presented for Problem 2, and this study explained the
relationship between the bene ts of participants and electricity prices in energy trading. About
Problem 3, consumers’ switching behavior was modeled as an evolutionary game. The results
demonstrated that both thenetwork structureand theexistenceof consumersactiveto switch suppliers
becomeimportant factors to promoteswitching behavior. Furthermore, in theresourcesharing model
presented for Problem 4, envy-freenesswasutilized asoneof themetricsof electricity sharing among
prosumers.
Considering theaboveexamplesof results, themarket modelspresented in thisthesisdemonstrated
several insights about consumers’ bene ts in liberalized electricity markets. Therefore, these models
are expected to contribute to providing insights for considering and examining market mechanisms
that will be developed in the transformation of electricity markets from now on. The advanced
understanding of the bene ts of consumers will contribute to decision making by both supply-side
and demand-side of themarkets.
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6.2 Limitationsand futureworks
The proposed modeling techniques have several limitations regarding the detailed characteristics of
electricity marketsthat havenot currently been integrated into themodels. Toenhancetheapplicability
of themodelsfor real-world problemsand obtain sophisticated insightsfrom themodels, thefollowing
topics are left as future works.
1. Usingdatasetsabout electricity production and consumption in experiments:
To construct more realistic electricity market models and validate the models e ectively, ex-
periments should use datasets of production and consumption of electricity. Many modeling
teamshavetraditionally restrictedaccessfor dataabout electricity productionanddemand [105].
Fortunately, there has been the movement toward opening up energy related data for improv-
ing reproducibility and transparency of energy modeling research recently [106]. Open Power
System Data is a platform of power data (including conventional and renewable plants) for
electricity system researchers [107]. Besides, Renewable.ninja provides simulation data about
the hourly output of worldwide solar and wind generation plants [108]. Regarding consumers’
behavioral data, however, havebeen still treated asclosed datasinceactual behavioral dataabout
consumers can be considered as sensitive data [109]. Thus, it is important to consider what
kindsof dataare available to improve the insights obtained from themodels.
2. Consideringdetailed time intervalsin time-varyingelectricity trading:
Regarding Problem 3 and 4, detailed time intervals in time-varying trading models should be
de ned to clarify the characteristics of electricity markets that the models represent. Focal
points will be di  erent according to the size of the time intervals represented by the models
(e.g. hourly, daily, monthly, and yearly basis) [110]. For instance, short-term time intervals
mainly focusonaspectsregardingcontrolson supply and demand inevery second, minute, hour,
etc. Besides, long-term time intervals can be utilized for planning over a few months about
generation combination, legislation, and so on.
91
3. Integratingmultiple factorsof theutility of consumers:
Although the utility function in this thesis only considers electricity charges as the factor of
consumers’ utility, the other factors should be considered in the utility function according to
future transitionsof electricity markets. Especially, it is inevitable to address theenvironmental
concerns regarding electricity generation and consumption worldwide for sustainable develop-
ment. Moreover, sincechoices for consumers in electricity marketsmight increase and change,
novel factors of theutility will beenabled by new market mechanisms in the future.
4. Increasingthenumber of nodesin network models:
For all of the four problems presented in this thesis, expanding scales of the market models is
important since the number of nodes used in the simulation experiments is considered to be
smaller than that in the real world. For thispurpose, algorithms to determine trading should be
improved to solve larger sizes of problems e ectively.
5. Assumingheterogeneousswitchingcostsof consumers:
Regarding themodel for analyzing the switching behavior of consumers for Problem 3, adding
heterogeneity of switching costs of consumers might provide additional insights about the
behavior of consumers. This topic requires extensive numerical experiments since the number
of patterns in parameter conditionswill considerably increase if consumers’ switching costsare
heterogeneous.
6. Addingdynamical transitionsof electricity prices:
Adjusting prices in the market model for Problem 3 and Problem 4 will demonstrate more
practical information than current models. Sinceelectricity pricesareassumed tobe xed in the




Convergenceof consumers’ strategiesin algorithmsfor
Problem 3
In theprocess of theevolutionary game for Problem 3 explained in Chapter 4, strategies of all buyers
will converge to D. Weshow theconvergence of thestrategies as follows.
Lemma 1 Each buyer bj will eventually discover only indi  erent sellers after a su cient number of
iterations if Xj and preference relation of bj over si do not change.
Proof: Suppose bj can  nd a preferred seller at every iteration. For iteration t (t = 1, 2, ...), let
at 1j ∈Xj betheseller from which bj purchaseselectricity at iteration t  1. bj can divide Xj into two
subsets: theset of preferred sellers P tj = {sk | µj (sk)  µj (a
t 1
j ) > ε} and theset of indi erent sellers






j =  ). For only bj ∈B
t
C, bj conducts the search for new alternatives at line 3
and 8 of Algorithm 3. For bj with both C and D, bj compares its current alternative with the other
alternatives suggested by theother buyers at line3, 5, 9, and 15 of Algorithm 4.
Therelationship between I tj , P
t
j , and I
t+1
j can beexplained asfollows. In thisproof, it isassumed





j ) found at t, the following condition must besatis ed.
µj (a
t
j )  µj (a
t 1
j ) > ε. (A1.1)
Let P tj = {sm ∈Xj | µj (sm)  µj (a
t 1
j ) > ε} and I
t
j = {sm ∈Xj | µj (sm)  µj (a
t 1
j )  ε} . The
relationship between P tj and I
t








j =  . Thus, a
t
j is
contained in either P tj or I
t





Weshow that I tj ⊂I
t+1
j if (A1.1) issatis ed. In other words, weexplain sm ∈I
t+1




Since I tj = {sm ∈Xj | µj (sm)  µj (a
t 1
j )  ε} , µj (sm)  µj (a
t 1
j )  ε. Therefore,
µj (sm)  µj (a
t 1
j ) + ε. (A1.2)
Moreover, because I t+1j = {sm ∈Xj | µj (sm)  µj (a
t
j )  ε} , µj (sm)  µj (a
t
j )  ε. Thus,
µj (sm)  µj (a
t
j ) + ε. (A1.3)
Furthermore, by (A1.1),
µj (at 1j ) + ε< µj (a
t
j ). (A1.4)
Since ε 0, even by adding εto right sideof (A1.4), the following condition issatis ed.
µj (at 1j ) + ε< µj (a
t
j ) + ε. (A1.5)
By (A1.2) and (A1.5),
µj (sm)  µj (at 1j ) + ε< µj (a
t
j ) + ε. (A1.6)
Condition (A1.6) means µj (sm) satis es (A1.3) if µj (sm) satis es (A1.2). Thus, if sm ∈I tj based


























sq ∈(I t+1j \ I
t
j ). Since sq ∈I
t+1
j , µj (sq)  µj (a
t
j )  ε. Moreover, since sq ! I
t
j , sq ∈P
t
j . Hence,
(I t+1j \ I
t
j ) can bedenoted as follows by using sq.
(I t+1j \ I
t
j ) = {sq | µj (sq)  µj (a
t
j )  ε, sq ∈P
t
j } .
Therefore, weobtain the following relationship between I t+1j and I
t
j .







= I tj ∪{sq | µj (sq)  µj (a
t




In thecomparison of sellers, bj can  nd apreferred seller sk only if compared seller sk iscontained
in P tj . For a
t 1
j discovered at t  1, if seller sk (sk ∈Xj ) chosen at t isapreferred seller, the following
condition is satis ed based on condition (4.1) in Chapter 4.
µj (sk)  µj (at 1j ) > ε.
Theset of preferred seller sk over at 1j is denoted by P
t
j = {sk ∈Xj | µj (sk)  µj (a
t 1
j ) > ε} .
atj at the start of Algorithm 4 can be considered as follows to clarify the relationship between
Algorithm 4 and P tj .
• If σt 1j = D :
atj = a
t 1
j at thestart of Algorithm 4 sincea
t




j at line12, Algorithm 2.
• If σt 1j = C :
If bj ∈BtC, Algorithm 3 will beexecuted at line9, Algorithm 2. At iteration t, a
t
j is initially set
as atj = a
t 1
j at line1, Algorithm 3. However, if sm(sm ∈Xj, sm " a
t 1
j ) satisfying
µj (sm)  µj (a
t











j = sm at the start
of Algorithm 4.




j = sm at the start of Algorithm 4. We will show preferred
seller sk ∈Xj over atj is contained in P
t






j = sm as follows.
• If atj = a
t 1
j :
If sk ∈Xj satis es the following condition, sk ∈P tj .
µj (sk)  µj (a
t 1
j ) > ε. (A1.8)
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• If atj = sm :
Let sk ∈Xj beaseller satisfying the following condition.
µj (sk)  µj (sm) > ε.(sm ∈Xj, sm " a
t 1
j ) (A1.9)
Since µj (sk) > µj (sm) + εby (A1.9) and ε 0, the following condition is satis ed.
µj (sk) > µj (sm). (A1.10)
By subtracting µj (at 1j ) from both sides of (A1.10),
µj (sk)  µj (a
t 1
j ) > µj (sm)  µj (a
t 1
j ). (A1.11)
Condition (A1.7) indicates that
µj (sm)  µj (a
t 1
j ) > ε. (A1.12)
By (A1.11) and (A1.12),
µj (sk)  µj (a
t 1
j ) > µj (sm)  µj (a
t 1
j ) > ε. (A1.13)
Therefore, the relationship between µj (sk) and µj (at 1j ) can bedenoted as
µj (sk)  µj (a
t 1
j ) > ε. (A1.14)
Because (A1.14) is thesameas (A1.8), theseconditions indicate sk ∈P tj .
Based on the conditions described above, we will show that preferred sellers contained in P tj in
line3, 5, 9, and 15 of Algorithm 4.
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• line3, Algorithm 4 (σt 1j = C, σ
t 1
i = C)
bj regards ati ∈Xj asapreferred seller if a
t
i satis es µj (a
t
i )  µj (a
t
j ) > ε, which is thecondition
of line 3. Since σt 1j = C, a
t






j = sm(sm " a
t 1




j , since the
condition of line3 is identical to µj (ati )  µj (a
t 1
j ) > ε, it becomesthesameas(A1.8). Besides,
if atj = sm, thecondition of line3 can bedescribed as µj (a
t
i )  µj (sm) > ε. Let a
t
i = sk, and the
condition of line3 is identical to (A1.10) in thiscase. Thus, ati ∈P
t
j if thecondition of line3 is
satis ed.
• line5, Algorithm 4 (σt 1j = C, σ
t 1
i = C)
bi regards atj ∈Xi as apreferred seller if a
t
j satis es µi (a
t
j )  µi (a
t
i ) > ε, which is thecondition
of line 5. Since σt 1i = C, a
t






i = sm(sm " a
t 1




i , since the
condition of line5 is identical to µi (atj )  µi (a
t 1
i ) > ε, it becomesthesameas(A1.8). Besides,
if ati = sm, the condition of line 5 can be described as µi (a
t
j )  µi (sm) > ε. Let a
t
j = sk, and
the condition of line 5 is identical to (A1.10). Therefore, atj ∈P
t
i if the condition of line 5 is
satis ed.
• line9, Algorithm 4 (σt 1j = C, σ
t 1
i = D)
bj regards ati ∈ Xj as a preferred seller if a
t
i satis es µj (a
t
i )  µj (a
t
j ) > ε, which is the




j . Because the condition in line 9 is identical to
µj (ati )  µj (a
t 1




j as thesameas condition (A1.8).
• line15, Algorithm 4 (σt 1j = D, σ
t 1
i = C)
bi regards atj ∈Xi as apreferred seller if a
t
j satis es µi (a
t
j )  µi (a
t
i ) > ε, which is thecondition




i . Because the condition in line 15 is identical to
µi (atj )  µi (a
t 1




i as thesameas condition (A1.8).
Otherwise, bj discovers sk ∈I tj , which is an indi  erent seller. The following discussion is based
on the iteration t at which thecondition |P tj | > 0 issatis ed. Let a
t
j ∈Xj beaseller chosen by bj at t.
For iteration t + 1, I t+1j can be de ned as I
t+1
j = {sm | µj (sm)  µj (a
t




j , and I
t+1
j ,
I t+1j = I
t
j ∪{sq | µj (sq)  µj (a
t
j )  ε, sq ∈P
t
j } . Sincea
t
j isat least contained in I
t+1
j , thesizeof I
t+1
j
will be denoted by |I t+1j |  |I
t
j | + 1. Adversely, |P
t+1
j |  |P
t
j |  1 because P
t+1
j = {sk | S \ I
t+1
j } .
Thus, |P tj | decreases at every iteration. Since |P
t
j | is  nite, there must be an iteration u that satis es
|Puj | = 0 after the su ciently large number of iterations. However, this contradicts the assumption
since there must be sk ∈Puj in thesearch of bj according to theassumption.  
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Lemma 2 With  xed Xj and preference relation of bj over si , |BtC| becomes 0 if I
t
j steadily enlarges.
Proof: Let usexplain bj must reach iteration t at which bj can only  nd atk ∈I
t
j . Asexplained above,
I tj increases if a
t
j is updated due to the discovery of preferred seller in P
t
j . From the assumption of
Lemma1, |Xj | is  xed. Moreover, P tj ∪I
t




j =  . Thus, P
t
j decreases if I
t
j increases.









Algorithm 3 and Algorithm 4.




j . In this case,
I tj does not increase. Thus, Algorithm 2 can terminate without satisfying I
t
j = Xj . Besides, by the
assumption of Lemma 1, ci is  xed for all si ∈Xj . Hence, µj (si ) is also  xed. Thus, if si ∈I tj at t,
there is no iteration t′at which si ∈P t
′
j after t. Therefore, bj must reach the iteration t at which bj
can only  nd atk ∈I
t
j .
We show that ρ(bj ) < 0 only if σtj = C. As described in line 26 of Algorithm 2, the de nition of
ρ(bj ) isas follows.
ρ(bj ) = µj (a
t





Since µj (atj )  0, r
t
j  0, and γ
t
j  0, (A2.1) becomes ρ(bj ) < 0 only if γ
t
j > 0.
• If σtj = C :
By line10 of Algorithm 2, γtj > 0. By (A2.1), ρ(bj ) can be ρ(bj ) < 0.
• If σtj = D :
By line13 of Algorithm 2, γtj = 0. By (A2.1), if σ
t
j = D, ρ(bj ) must satisfy ρ(bj )  0.
Therefore, ρ(bj ) < 0 is satis ed only if σtj = C.
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Next, weshow that ρ(bj ) < 0 if bj can only  nd atj ∈I
t







j in Algorithm 3 and Algorithm 4. In this case, µj (a
t
j ) = 0. Moreover, because Ψ
t
j =  in
Algorithm 2 and Algorithm 4 in this case, the procedures of line 18-23 of Algorithm 2 will not be
executed. Therefore, r tj = 0. Furthermore, since σ
t
j = C, γ
t
j > 0 according to line10 of Algorithm 2.
By (A2.1), ρ(bj ) < 0. Therefore, for bj with σtj = C,  nally ρ(bj ) < 0.





determined after theprocess from line28 to line41 of Algorithm 2.
• If ρmax < 0 :
Since ρmax < 0, for bj and all buyer bk adjacent to bj , ρ(bj ) < 0, ρ(bk) < 0. Thus, σtj = C and
σtk = C. σ
t
j will bechanged to σ
t
j = D by line29-31, Algorithm 2.
• If ρmax  0 :
σtj will be determined to either C or D according to the condition of line 35-37 of Algorithm
2. Since ρ(bj ) < 0 for bj with σtj = C, σ
t
m = D for bm with ρmax  0. Because ρ(bj ) < 0 and
σtm = D, theconditionsof line35, 36 of Algorithm 2 aresatis ed. Thus, strategy of bj becomes
σtj = D in this case.
As described above, sinceall buyer bj ∈BtC  nally decide σ
t
m = D,  nally |B
t
C| = 0.  
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Theorem 1 After su ciently large number of iterations, all buyer bj ∈B eventually choose σtj = D
at an iteration t if Xj and preference relation of bj over si do not change.
Proof: Suppose |BtC| > 0 at every iteration t. As shown in Lemma 1, bj ∈B can only  nd si ∈I
t
j
after asu cient number of iterations. For bj ∈BtC, µ(bj ) = 0 since si ∈P
t
j cannot be found.
Suggestion conducted by bj cannot be succeeded because any other bk ∈B do not have si ∈P tj .
Asdescribed above, atj ∈P
t
i holds if each of conditions in line5 and 15 of Algorithm 4 ismet. Then,
atj will be added to Ψ
t




j holds if each of conditions
in line3 and 9 of Algorithm 4 ismet. ati will beadded to Ψ
t
j in line4 and 10 in Algorithm 4.
Conversely, conditionsof line5 and 15 in Algorithm 4 arenot met if atj ∈I
t
i . Sinceno seller will
be added to Ψti in this case, Ψ
t
i =  . Likewise, conditions of line 3 and 9 in Algorithm 4 are not met
if atj ∈I
t
j . Becauseno seller will be added to Ψ
t
j in this case, Ψ
t
j =  .
If P tj =  for bj , Ψ
t
j =  as described abovesince I
t




i . The condition of line18
in Algorithm 2 is not met in this condition. Therefore, line 19 of Algorithm 2 will not be reached in
thiscase.
Hence, r tj = 0, and ρ(bj ) =  γ
t
j . Therefore, ρ(bj ) < 0. Considers the following two cases divided
according to |BtD |.
Case1. |BtD | " 0:
Both of strategies C and D remain at any iteration t in this case. For bk ∈BtD, ρ(bk)  0 since
r tk = 0 due to σ
t
k = D. Thus, for bj ∈B
t
C and bk ∈B
t
D, ρ(bk) > ρ(bj ). As described in line 29-31
in Algorithm 2, bj changeσtj from C to D. Hence, |B
t
C|  nally becomeszero at an iteration t. This
contradicts theassumption.
Case2. |BtD | = 0:
In thiscase, all buyerschoosestrategy C at any iteration. Since|BtC| = |B|, ρ(bj ) < 0and ρ(bk) < 0
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